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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 10 Chapter 1 
Professional environments in which complex judgment and decision making skills play a 
crucial role, such as the military and international business, are characterized by increasing 
interdependency and complexity. Therefore, judgment nowadays has to be exercised on 
matters with more important consequences than was ever the case in the past (Klein, 
Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007; Van den Bosch & de Beer, 2007). In such professional 
environments, the decisions of only one or a few persons can affect the livelihoods of very 
large groups of people. Consider, for example, a central executive officer (CEO) of a 
multinational company deciding whether to move a production facility from The Netherlands 
to India in order to maximize profit, stock value, and long-term prospects for the company. 
In making this judgment, s/he may take the costs of labour, the infrastructure, the political 
stability, and the availability of adequate personnel in both countries into account, as well as 
the consequences of distributed management processes, of creating jobs in developing 
countries, and of closing a production facility in The Netherlands. Clearly, this CEO is faced 
with an extremely difficult and complex decision-making process, having to consider all these 
interrelated, often uncertain or unknown, and highly dynamic factors. Moreover, there is the 
pressing awareness that the final decision affects the lives of many people both in The 
Netherlands and in India.  
Too often, in hindsight complex judgments and decisions are suboptimal. Especially novices 
with relatively little experience consider aspects of the situation literally rather than 
conceptually. They regard cues, factors, and features separately and treat them as being 
independent of each other (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). A central executive officer with 
relatively little experience, for instance, may decide to move the production facility to India 
because this country scores higher than The Netherlands on most of the identified factors. 
Yet, this might prove to be a bad decision later on because serious communication problems 
develop between the Indian production facility and other production facilities in Europe, due 
to differences in language and culture . Whereas the novice CEO carefully compared the 
advantages and disadvantages of setting up the facility in both countries, s/he forgot about 
the wider context of communication and cooperation between different establishments of 
the same multinational company. In short, novices have great problems with complex 
judgment and decision making because they have difficulties applying their knowledge and 
skills in quickly changing and highly complex situations (Hoffman, 2007).  
Because of the complexity and required flexibility of complex judgment and decision making 
skills, it is of utmost importance that professional decision makers are well prepared for 
their tasks and acquire a level of understanding that enables them to operate adequately on 
different tasks and in different contexts, that is, to transfer their knowledge and skills from 
the training task or context to new tasks or contexts. Research on judgment and decision 
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making has identified several defining features of experienced decision makers. Their 
experience enables them to recognize a large number of situations as familiar, and has 
allowed them to develop typical solutions or strategies available for those situations (Klein & 
Calderwood, 1991). Furthermore, when confronted with new, unfamiliar problem situations, 
experienced decision makers critically evaluate the available evidence, try to explain events 
in a comprehensive story that incorporates all available observations, attempt to identify any 
gaps in such a story, seek additional information and make assumptions about those gaps, 
and continuously test these assumptions in a critical way whenever new evidence is found 
(Alison & Barrett, 2004; Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; Innes, 2003; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992; Robinson & Hawpe, 1986). Thus, an expert CEO would probably rely on his or 
her knowledge of successful and unsuccessful moves of production facilities from one 
country to another country, and use this knowledge base for an in-depth analysis of 
advantages and disadvantages of a possible move in the given situation. 
In order to help novices become expert decision makers, critical thinking instruction for 
complex judgment and decision making skills may be developed based on the known 
characteristics of experienced decision makers (Cohen et al., 1998). Simultaneously, critical 
thinking instruction aims to present learners with many prototypical problem situations to 
help them build a large and integrated body of knowledge to facilitate the process of 
recognition-primed decision making (Klein, 1989). Such a knowledge base includes the 
cognitive strategies that may be applied in novel and ambiguous situations, facilitating transfer 
of knowledge and skills from one type of decision problems to other types of problems, 
conditions, and decision making tasks (Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 2007).  
As stated before, this transfer of knowledge and skills from learning tasks to real world tasks 
or from one task domain to another domain, is paramount for professional decision makers  
working in continuously changing environments. The degree of transfer depends both on the 
degree to which task activities call upon the same procedural skills and on the learner’s level 
of understanding of a task domain (Detterman & Sternberg, 1993; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; 
Mayer & Wittrock, 1993). Van Merriënboer (1997) describes these two processes as, in 
order, rule-based transfer and schema-based transfer and their combined use as ‘reflective 
expertise’. A process of abstraction is needed to gain deep understanding of a domain, by 
proceeding from knowledge of the task at hand to a higher level of generalized knowledge, 
which is in turn required for transfer to different tasks or domains. Contextual interference 
may enhance such abstraction processes (De Croock, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). 
Contextual interference refers to the interference a task performer experiences between 
consecutive tasks; high contextual interference occurs for example when several variations 
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of the task are practiced in a random order. This high interference has proven to benefit 
transfer of knowledge and skills (for an overview, see Brady, 1998; Schmidt & Bjork, 1993). 
Both critical thinking instruction and contextual interference have been proven to be 
effective for transfer of knowledge and skills. However, the effects of critical thinking 
instruction have mostly been studied in real-world educational programs, that is, with small 
numbers of participants and with little experimental control over the sequence of learning 
events and the timing of instructor interventions (e.g., Cohen et al.1998; Cohen, Thompson, 
Adelman, Bresnick, Shastri, & Riedel, 2000; Freeman & Cohen, 1997). The effects of 
contextual interference on learning, retention and transfer, on the other hand, have been 
extensively studied in controlled experiments. It has been studied in many domains, 
however, almost no attention has been paid to the effects of contextual interference on 
learning complex judgment and decision making skills (Brehmer, 1973, 1977, 1979). 
Moreover, the combined effects of critical thinking instruction and contextual interference 
have not been investigated before. Yet, it might be the case that both approaches can 
strengthen each other or, on the contrary, interfere with each other.  
Concluding, this dissertation presents a series of field studies and laboratory experiments 
that systematically investigate the effects of critical thinking instruction and contextual 
interference, separately and in combination, on learning, retention, and transfer of complex 
judgment and decision making skills.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
The studies presented in this dissertation seek to answer the following research questions:  
1. Does critical thinking instruction improve learning of a complex judgment and 
decision making task?  
2. Does the contextual interference effect manifest itself in learning a complex 
judgment task? 
3. What are the combined effects of contextual interference and critical thinking 
prompts on acquisition and transfer test performance of a complex judgment 
task?  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the characteristics of complex judgment tasks and of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the expected effects of critical thinking instruction and 
contextual interference on learning, retention, and transfer. Chapter 3 addresses the first 
research question. Two field studies are presented that assessed the effects of critical 
thinking instruction on learning complex judgment tasks. Chapter 4 focuses on the second 
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research question. Two experiments are described that investigated the potential benefits of 
a random practice schedule (i.e., high contextual interference) compared to a blocked 
practice schedule (i.e., low contextual interference) for retention and transfer test 
performance of a complex judgment task. Chapter 5 addresses the third research question. 
An experiment is presented that investigated the effects of critical thinking prompts in 
blocked and random practice schedules on acquisition, retention, and transfer test 
performance of a complex judgment task. Chapter 6 presents a general, overall discussion of 
the findings of the studies presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. This chapter also discusses the 
implications of our findings for further theory development and educational practice.  
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Abstract 
A review of the literature on Social Judgment Theory (SJT) and Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) is provided here, which reveals that learning complex 
judgment and decision making involves: (1) learning what the relevant cues upon 
which to base a decision are and how they are related to each other, and (2) 
learning cognitive strategies that guide the learning and decision making processes. 
Within both the SJT and NDM research approach, the effects of several 
interventions aimed at learning either cues and their interrelations or cognitive 
strategies have been investigated. These studies focussed mostly on performance 
during learning and/or on retention, that is, later performance on the same tasks. 
However, empirical evaluations of the effects on transfer, that is, later 
performance on novel tasks were scarce. Therefore, this chapter continues with a 
discussion of measures that may be effective for enhancing transfer of complex 
judgment skills, such as critical thinking instruction and contextual interference. 
People make numerous choices, decisions, and judgments throughout their lives. Every day 
they decide what to eat for breakfast, which shoes to wear, how to commute to the office 
and by what route, and whether it is safe to cross the street. Somewhat less frequently they 
make decisions with higher impact, such as accepting jobs, buying houses, and marrying life 
partners. These are just a few examples that illustrate how many choices, decisions, and 
judgments people have to make during everyday life.  
The goal of research on judgment and decision making is to investigate how people make 
those judgments and decisions, how accurate they are in doing so, and how the process can 
be improved. The findings from this research can be used to design or improve training 
programs for decision makers. Training these skills is of utmost importance because 
professional decision makers make judgments on a wide variety of highly complex issues, 
often with far-reaching consequences for large groups of people. Therefore, a major aim of 
training programs is to establish transfer of decision making skills from the learning tasks to 
professional tasks in real-life contexts.  
The main goal of this chapter is to describe theoretical perspectives on learning and teaching 
complex judgment and decision making. The first section describes two prominent 
approaches in decision making research: Social Judgment Theory (SJT) and Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM). Thereafter, instructional methods that enhance transfer are 
described, incorporating a description of specific methods such as critical thinking instruction 
and increasing contextual interference between learning tasks. The chapter ends with 
concluding remarks on how these methods might work in training complex judgment.  
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Studying Decision Making: SJT and NDM Approaches 
Although the processes of making decisions and judgments have been extensively studied, 
there is not one single scientific approach or method. Different research paradigms or 
guiding theories can be distinguished, for example, social judgment theory (Raiffa, 1997; 
Sherif & Hovland, 1961) and naturalistic decision making (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & 
Zsambok, 1993), but also decision theory (Lehman, 1950; Raiffa, 1997), behavioral decision 
theory (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981), attribution theory (Heider, 1958), utility theory 
(Fishburn, 1970), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), et cetera. These approaches 
differ on several aspects. First, they differ in their focus on what is studied, which can be, for 
example, the elements of decision problems, the process of generating alternatives, the 
process of choosing between alternatives, predictive judgment, evaluative judgment, dynamic 
decisions, static choices, the process of acquiring and aggregating information, or how and 
when people deviate from rationality. Second, there are differences in how the research is 
conducted, for example, in the laboratory, in the field, by formal analysis, empirical analysis, 
or experimental manipulations. Third, researchers studying judgment and decision making 
come from different disciplines, such as economics, psychology, operations research, 
statistics, and so forth. And lastly, there are differences between the goals of research, which 
can be either to describe and explain human judgment and decision making, to improve 
training programs, or to develop formal models prescribing how decisions should best be 
made.  
In all different paradigms, the question of representativeness of the research conditions for 
real-life decision making and the resulting generalizability of the conclusions is a common 
concern (Hammond, McLelland, & Mumpower, 1980). On one side of the continuum, there 
are the simple choice problems in a laboratory setting to study the effects of several 
parameters on the choices people make. The problem with these choice problems is that 
they are often not representative of the many decision problems people encounter in their 
daily or professional life. However, these laboratory experiments do provide the 
opportunity to exercise strict experimental control over the research conditions, to 
investigate large groups of participants, and to manipulate many parameters; aspects that 
increase the generalizability of the conclusions. On the other end of the continuum are pre-
experimental and quasi-experimental studies conducted in field settings. In these settings, 
professional judgment and decision making processes can be studied under natural 
conditions, although there is often a lack of experimental control, a small number of 
participants, and a limited opportunity for experimental manipulations.  
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Two approaches, using elements from both ends of the continuum, are applied in this 
dissertation and will be discussed in the next sections. They are chosen because they both 
focus on how people acquire judgment and decision making skills and emphasize the 
representativeness of the study methods. These approaches are Social Judgment Theory 
(SJT; Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Sherif & Hovland, 1961) and Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM; Klein et al., 1993). Within SJT, a major research focus is on so-called ‘multiple 
functional learning’ experiments in the laboratory, whereas in the NDM approach real world 
decision making is studied in the field.  
Social Judgment Theory: Multiple Functional Learning  
In Chapter 1, a hypothetical decision problem of a central executive officer (CEO) of a large 
company was sketched, namely, the CEO must decide on the best strategy to optimize his 
or her company’s profits, survivability, and stock value: Moving production to India or 
keeping it in The Netherlands? When the CEO thinks about such a complex judgment 
problem points of reference may be considered that are expected to be related to the 
target, such as labor costs, infrastructure, inflation rates, and so forth. These points of 
reference are part of the CEO’s mental representation of the network of relationships 
between elements (objects, events) in the environment and the event to be predicted. 
Accuracy of the judgment depends on the extent to which the CEO’s mental representation 
matches the real network of relationships (Hogarth, 1980). It is this match, or lack thereof, 
that is the object of study within SJT (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond, McClelland, & 
Mumpower, 1980).  
SJT is modeled after Brunswik’s theory of perception (Brunswik, 1943, 1955). According to 
that theory, a person does not have access to any direct information about the objects in 
the environment. Instead, perception is seen as an indirect process, mediated by a set of 
proximal cues (i.e., points of reference). The perceptual system uses these cues to make 
inferences about distal objects. In accordance with this view, SJT defines judgment as a 
process that involves the integration of information from a set of cues into a judgment about 
some distal state of affairs (Hogart, 1980). SJT emphasizes that the probabilistic and 
interdependent relations among variables in the natural environment create cognitive 
difficulties for the person attempting to understand it. For example, in his studies of clinical 
judgment, Hammond (1955, 1996) noted that the information a clinician receives from a 
patient is dependent upon the actions performed on or questions posed to that patient. 
Thus, the clinician must be aware of this interaction to be able to make an accurate 
diagnosis. Furthermore, s/he needs to learn that different symptoms may lead to the same 
judgment since one patient may report one set of symptoms, whereas another patient having 
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the same disease may report another set of symptoms. Brunswik (1955) called this capacity 
to make use of alternatives vicarious functioning. For human perception – and cognition – as 
well as for human action, vicarious functioning seems a necessary capacity to cope with 
inconsistent, unexpected, incomplete, and imperfect events (Gigerenzer & Kurz, 1999). 
Within the SJT research paradigm, an experimental method was devised to study how 
people learn such difficult judgment tasks: The (Multiple) Cue Probability Learning 
experiment (MCPL; Björkman, 1965; Brehmer, 1972; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Brunswik & 
Herma, 1951; Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; 
Smedslund, 1955), also referred to as Multidimensional Functional Learning (MFL; P. J. 
Hoffman, Earle, & Slovic, 1981). During a typical MFL experiment a person makes judgments 
based on a number of probabilistic cues over a series of trials. Feedback may be given on 
each trial, or feedback may be given after subsets of trials. The aim is to correctly predict the 
quantitative or categorical criterion value on each trial. Cues differ in terms of their 
relevance (ecological validity) to the criterion. For example, being nauseated is rarely a 
symptom of having a brain tumor, and vice versa, when a patient has a brain tumor, nausea is 
an infrequent symptom (Chandana, Movva, Arora, & Singh, 2008), thus, nausea is a low 
validity cue for a brain tumor. 
MFL studies have focused on how people learn to discover cues and judge the importance of 
these cues (Klayman, 1988a). In particular, it has been studied how learning and transfer 
performance are affected by parameters of the task (e.g., linearity of relationships between 
variables, predictability of cues, meaningful labels, time pressure; Edland, 1993; Koh, 1993), 
the nature and timing of given feedback (e.g., delayed feedback, cognitive feedback, outcome 
feedback, feedforward; Balzer, Sulsky, Hammer, & Sumner,1992), and characteristics of the 
task performer (e.g., age, goal setting, prior knowledge or experience; Alm & Brehmer, 
1982; Chasseigne, Mullet, & Stewart, 1997; P. J. Hoffman et al., 1981). From these studies, it 
became clear that performance is higher when (a) linear relationships exist between cues 
and the criterion (Alm, 1982a; Brehmer, 1979, 1987; Hammond & Summers, 1965), (b) these 
relationships are positive rather than negative (Björkman, 1965; Brehmer, 1977; Sheets & 
Miller, 1974), (c) cues have meaningful rather than abstract labels (Koele, 1980; Muchinsky & 
Dudycha, 1975; Ruble & Cosier,1990), (d) there is no time pressure (Rothstein, 1986), (e) 
positive feedback is given rather than negative feedback (Klayman, 1988b), and (f) 
participants set goals for themselves (DeShon & Alexander, 1996).  
Also, interactions have been found between task difficulty and feedback strategy on complex 
judgment performance (Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989; Lindell, 1976; Tsao, 1994; 
Wigton, Patil, & Hoellerich, 1986). For complex tasks, cognitive feedback often renders best 
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performance, but in simple tasks outcome feedback is better. Whereas outcome feedback 
only provides information on the correctness of a decision, cognitive feedback concerns 
characteristics of the task as well as characteristics of the person’s cognitive processes to 
reach a decision (Hammond et al., 1964). First, cognitive feedback may include information 
on the relationships between the criterion and the cues, or the ecological validity of the cues 
(Doherty & Balzer, 1988). Second, information may be given on the correlation between the 
participants’ estimated relationships between cues and the criterion and the actual 
relationships between those cues and the criterion. Third, cognitive feedback may also 
provide the learner with information on his or her own learning process (e.g., weights a 
participant ascribes to cues or the stability of the applied judgment strategy).  
Cognitive feedback may include either one or more of the aspects mentioned above. For 
example, in a study by Gattie and Bisantz (2006), which investigated the effects of different 
types of cognitive feedback on task performance in a dental diagnosis task, participants had 
to judge whether a dental condition was benign or malicious on the basis of a patient’s age, 
gender, tumor growth location, growth size, growth color, and cancer risk. In the first 
cognitive feedback condition, participants received information on the weight they ascribed 
to each of those indicators, calculated continuously based on regression analysis of their 
decisions. In the second condition, participants received information on the task: The 
relationships between cues and criterion, the validity of cues, and so forth. In the third 
condition, participants received information on the correlation between their own decisions 
and the actual task properties. Both the information on decision strategies (first condition) 
and on the task (second condition) improved participants’ performance. Feedback on the 
decision strategies was especially helpful for novice participants, which suggests that 
participants who are unfamiliar with the experimental task or the specific domain may need 
to understand their own decision policies in order to be able to learn. Furthermore, the task 
information provided may have made individuals more aware of the appropriate cues that 
should be examined. The study failed to find any benefit of the third cognitive feedback 
condition, compared to the outcome feedback condition. 
Regrettably, in most MFL studies including the Gattie and Bisantz (2006) study discussed 
above, participants’ performance was only measured during the learning phase. This is 
problematic, because observed performance during the learning phase can be a notoriously 
poor guide to predicting learning outcomes, that is, post-training performance (Bjork, 1994; 
see also the next section on ‘Enhancing Learning and Transfer’). Only a few MFL studies 
measured test performance after a retention interval (e.g., Alm, 1982b; Bauer, 1971; 
Brehmer & Lindberg, 1973) or transfer of learning to new, unfamiliar tasks (e.g., Andersson 
& Brehmer, 1977; Brehmer, 1977, 1979; Brehmer & Almqvist, 1977; Lindberg & Brehmer, 
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1976). However, transfer of knowledge and skills across domains is a prerequisite for 
vicarious functioning, that is, the ability to perform adequately in different contexts and use 
different cues. And vicarious functioning is a necessary capacity to cope with inconsistent, 
unexpected, incomplete, and imperfect events (Gigerenzer & Kurz, 1999). 
Concluding, MFL experiments use representative experimental tasks that adequately capture 
the major characteristics of complex judgment tasks. But although many task-related, 
feedback-related, and learner-related aspects were investigated for their effects on 
performance during learning and retention, few studies have focused on transfer effects. 
Furthermore, the effects of cognitive feedback that have been found suggest that measures 
that improve understanding may enhance learning of complex judgment tasks. Such measures 
are, for example, specific instructional methods to increase understanding through 
elaborative processing, such as providing critical-thinking prompts or increasing task 
interference. 
Naturalistic Decision Making  
The previous section described SJT and its MFL experiment as a powerful approach to study 
complex judgment tasks. However, the design of typical MFL experimental tasks, with a fixed 
set of cues and a trial-by-trial presentation of cue values and feedback, departs from two of 
Brunswik’s central ideas on human performance described earlier: Vicarious functioning and 
the idea that a person’s actions affect the information s/he collects. Therefore, this 
dissertation not only presents the results of MFL studies, but also empirical evaluations of 
learning naturalistic decision making tasks in the field of military command and control. 
Because of the interactive nature of command and control decision making, the 
commander’s decisions influence the situation and the information s/he collects. 
Furthermore, a military commander has to prepare for a wide variety of decision problems 
and task environments (R. R. Hoffman, 2007). Thus, any training program should aim to 
present many different scenarios because the learners must learn to deal with many different 
alternatives (i.e., vicarious functioning). 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is a relatively recent approach in decision making 
research (Klein et al., 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). It focuses on the question of how 
people make use of their expertise in real world judgment and decision making tasks. 
Whereas many laboratory experiment approaches to judgment and decision making tend to 
focus on the process of weighing options and making choices, NDM investigates judgment 
and decision making as the complete process from collecting information to generating 
actions. Moreover, this process is studied in professional environments in which experience 
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is not viewed as a confounding variable, as it often is in traditional judgment and decision 
making studies, but as an object of study in its own right (Klein, 1997; Klein & Calderwood, 
1991).  
The NDM paradigm is explanatory in nature: Research aims to identify the cognitive 
processes and representations that underlie people’s judgments and decisions. Heuristics, or 
rules of thumb, are considered to be adaptive strategies that enable people to behave 
adequately in quickly changing and complex situations (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2001). These 
heuristics can be false or may prove to be inadequate in certain situations, but nevertheless 
they are valuable because they allow for flexibility in new situations and increase the chance 
that an acceptable decision or judgment is made. Thus, NDM suggests that normative 
decision models should be based on cognitive and behavioral criteria, not on a formal 
analysis of the decision problem. 
 Orasanu and Connolly (1993) identified eight aspects of tasks that make them relevant 
experimental tasks within NDM research: (1) ill structured problems, (2) uncertain, dynamic 
environments, (3) changing, ill defined, or conflicting goals, (4) multiple feedback loops, (5) 
time pressure, (6) major interests, (7) several parties involved, and (8) individual goals have 
to be weighed against the organizational goals. Klein (1998) states that NDM research using 
this kind of tasks has confirmed that decision making is a process of situation assessment 
rather than weighing options and choosing. Experienced decision makers do not seem to be 
troubled by weighing options: Their real challenge lies in acquiring an adequate and realistic 
overview of the situation. Moreover, the so-called zone of indifference could render studies 
with an exclusive focus on weighing options and making choices trivial: If two options are 
very alike the choice between the two becomes harder, whereas the consequences of 
choosing one option above the other become negligible.  
On the basis of NDM studies on real-world decision making, Klein and colleagues (Klein, 
1989; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) have formulated the Recognition Primed 
Decision (RPD) model. This model describes how people use their experience to assess 
situations and make decisions. They match their observations of the current situation with 
what they remember from earlier experiences (i.e., their mental model), and then generate a 
prototypical option or a sequence of options they can evaluate one by one (i.e., by running a 
mental simulation of their mental model). If the option is satisfactory, it is selected. Thus, 
selection of options is not based on a parallel weighing of options, but on a sequential 
consideration of the adequacy of one option at the time (Drillings & Serfaty, 1997). The RPD 
model further encompasses a diagnostic function (Klein, 1998), which people use to explain 
the observed events in a situation and to indentify causal relationships between these events. 
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This diagnosis function serves as an evaluative process in uncertain situations and intervenes 
when explanations, or possible matches between observations and memory, diverge.  
Recognition and situation assessment are important functions in NDM models. Klein, Moon, 
and R. R. Hoffman (2006) distinguished two levels in their data/frame theory of sensemaking: 
The level of mental model formation which is backward looking and explanatory, and the 
mental simulation which is forward looking and anticipatory. They posit that decision makers 
always apply a frame, that is, some mental model based on experiences, when they observe 
and interpret the world around them. This frame serves the two levels of sensemaking: It 
guides both explanation of the situation and prediction of future events. Expertise is 
characterized by large amounts of relevant representations of prototypical experiences in 
memory as well as efficient structuring and chunking of this information to facilitate instant 
retrieval (Chase & Simon, 1973). It allows experts to represent problems in terms of deep 
theoretical principles rather than surface features as novices commonly do (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; H. G. Schmidt, Norman, & 
Boshuizen, 1990). In other words, experts have better mental models allowing them to 
identify and select relevant cues and patterns in a situation (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 
1997; Vincente, 1988; Vincente & Wang, 1998) and to perform more effective searches for 
further information (Lipshitz & Ben Shaul, 1998; Serfaty, Macmillan, Entin, & Entin, 1998). 
This role of mental models and expertise is also emphasized in the 
recognition/metacognition model of Cohen, Freeman and Wolf (1996). In many situations, 
people’s decisions are based on recognition of aspects of a situation, matching recognized 
aspects with earlier experiences, and forming a mental model of the current situation that 
implies a prototypical or sufficient decision option. However, this mental model will often be 
incomplete or inconsistent because of missing information, conflicting evidence, and 
unreliable assumptions. Critically testing and evaluating one’s mental model are therefore 
considered paramount in the decision process, especially when high stakes are involved, 
when problems are dynamic and complex, or both. These critical thinking skills typically are 
not part of a training program for professional decision making; they are mainly acquired as a 
result of experience in the field (Anderson, 1993; Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 1993). However, 
on the basis of their recognition/metacognition model,  Freeman and Cohen (1996) 
developed an instructional strategy to teach these critical thinking skills.  
Critical thinking is conceptualized as higher order thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and 
goal directed. It is involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating 
likelihoods, and making decisions (Frijters, Ten Dam, & Rijlaarsdam, 2008; Halpern, 2003). 
Within the critical thinking research community, there is an ongoing debate on the issue of 
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generalizability versus specificity of critical thinking skills (Siegel, 1991). Some studies have 
shown that special critical thinking programs usually do not result in long-lasting effects 
(Tsui, 1999). But at the same time, several authors point out that some general principles of 
critical thinking transcend specific subjects (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Tsui, 1999). As mentioned before, transfer of skills across different tasks and knowledge 
domains is important because today’s jobs require professionals to work in continuously 
changing contexts. Still, the development of expertise in judgment and decision making skills 
is thought to be largely domain-specific (Ten Dam & Volman, 2002; Tsui, 1999). In their own 
domain, experienced decision makers quickly identify meaningful factors, realize what 
information they may be missing, recognize typical problems, and recall appropriate actions; 
in unfamiliar domains, the same decision makers may be at loss as to what the relevant 
factors are, thus making it impossible to realize missing information or come up with 
appropriate actions (Klein & Calderwood, 1991). Therefore, the challenge is to teach critical 
thinking in the context of specific meaningful subject matter, but yet in such a way that 
transfer to other tasks and domains becomes possible (Brown, 1997; Frijters et al., 2008).  
Enhancing Learning and Transfer  
As mentioned before, many SJT and NDM studies measure performance during the learning 
phase to draw conclusions about how different instructional methods stimulate or hamper 
learning. However, learning is best understood as the observable change or modification in 
behaviour as a result of experience (Skinner, 1950; Thorndike, 1910). This definition reveals 
the inherent difficulty in establishing whether a person has learned something: Performance 
is observed, but learning is inferred. And performance during a learning or acquisition phase 
can be a notoriously poor guide to infer actual learning outcomes. Many studies have shown 
that although no apparent changes in performance were observed between conditions A and 
B during learning tasks, or inferior performance was found in, say, condition A compared to 
condition B, performance after a (short) interval on subsequent test tasks can yet be 
substantially higher in condition A – indicating that more or better learning must have taken 
place during the learning phase in this condition (Bjork & Bjork, 2006). The converse has 
been found true as well: When performance during the learning phase improves quickly and 
substantially, this improvement may no longer appear on the test. This shows that substantial 
changes in performance during a learning phase (i.e., apparent learning) are not always good 
indicators of actual learning (Bjork, 1994; Bjork & Bjork, 2006).  
The same “paradox” applies to transfer of learning, which –as mentioned before- is usually 
the ultimate goal of training programs: Instructional strategies that appear to slow the 
learner’s progress during instruction or training often lead to better transfer test 
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performance (Van Merriënboer, De Croock, & Jelsma, 1997). A distinction is often made 
between near transfer and far transfer. Near transfer tasks share structural features but 
differ on superficial or surface features from the learning tasks, whereas far transfer tasks 
differ from the learning tasks on both surface and structural features (Quilici & Mayer, 1996, 
provide a good description). Thus, the degree of transfer depends on the degree to which 
task activities call upon the same type of skill, but also on the learner’s level of understanding 
of a task (Detterman & Sternberg, 1993; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Mayer & Wittrock, 1993). 
Near transfer can be obtained if the learner knows what to do when (procedural knowledge), 
whereas far transfer is usually possible only if the learner also knows why he needs to do 
that, that is, has the knowledge to interpret whether particular actions may be effective or 
not (conceptual knowledge; Van Merriënboer, 1997). To gain such deep understanding 
required for far transfer, a process of generalization and/or abstraction is needed, from 
knowledge of the task at hand to a higher level of knowledge, for instance, of the general 
principles of a domain or the general procedures for performing a class or even several 
classes of tasks (Van Merriënboer & Paas, 1990). 
Instructional measures such as reflection (Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 1985), prompted self-
explanations during learning (Chi, 1996; Renkl, 1997; Stark, Mandl, Gruber, & Renkl, 2002), 
contextual interference between learning tasks (Battig, 1979; Magill & Hall, 1990), practice 
variability (Burke & Hutchins, 2007), the use of degraded stimuli (Kunen, Green, & 
Waterman, 1979), and infrequent feedback (Wulf & Shea, 2002) may enhance this process of 
generalization and abstraction. Critical thinking instruction as developed by Freeman and 
Cohen (1996) encompasses elements of reflection and self-explanation and thus may also be 
expected to enhance transfer via processes of generalization and abstraction. In this 
dissertation, studies are reported that focus on the effects of critical thinking and contextual 
interference in learning complex judgment and decision making tasks. These two 
instructional measures will be discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
Critical Thinking 
Critical thinking instruction as it was developed by Freeman and Cohen (1997) on the basis 
of their recognition/metacognition theory aims to develop two types of skill: Recognition 
skills and metacognitive skills. Recognition is the mechanism that enables experienced 
decision makers to select all relevant cues from the situation to activate or form an accurate 
mental model of this situation. To develop the experience necessary to recognize a vast 
amount of situations, an individual needs to be confronted with many different situations and 
discover the relevant cues, rather than being told what aspects or cues are important in 
what situations (Stout et al., 1997). Training should therefore be focused on presenting as 
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many relevant problem situations as possible, and each situation should incorporate one or 
more relevant cues. Stout et al. developed specific cueing training, in which they support 
novices by ‘augmenting’ relevant cues. This augmentation can be visual, for example by 
increasing contrast values on a screen, or auditory, for example by presenting a warning 
signal. But it may also be accomplished by asking specific questions or providing feedback 
during training in order to focus a learner’s attention on specific cues.  
The (meta)cognitive skills that are part of the recognition/metacognition model involve skills 
to indentify evidence-conclusion relationships, criticize the mental model, adapt the mental 
model, and perform so called quick tests. Quick tests investigate whether there is sufficient 
time and opportunity to continue with elaborative processing, or whether the current 
mental model should serve as the basis for an immediate decision (Freeman & Cohen, 1996). 
Therefore, the training program for military officers that Freeman and Cohen developed not 
only involved the presentation of many different problem situations, but also contained four 
specific steps to instruct and prompt the elaborative processes: 
1. Develop a story (i.e., form a mental model) of the situation. Incorporate history, 
intentions and capacities of all parties involved in your story to explain all your 
observations and predict future events. 
2. Test your story for conflicting and/or missing information. Try to explain all 
observations within one comprehensive story, even if these observations do not 
seem to be related to your story. Identify gaps in your story and make explicit 
assumptions to cover these gaps. 
3. Evaluate your story. There is the devil’s advocate that tells you—part of—your story 
is false. Try to come up with an alternative story that can also explain your 
observations. Which story is more plausible? 
4. Develop plans and contingencies for the weakest assumptions in your story. 
Analyses of historic events may serve as training materials for story building. In such 
analyses, the decision processes of professionals involved are often documented, and as a 
consequence, all elements of a comprehensive story can be easily identified. During story 
building, testing, and evaluating, it is necessary to constantly monitor whether critical 
thinking is still useful and wise in the current situation, or whether immediate action is 
required. The three preconditions that call for continued critical thinking are: 
1. The risk of delay is acceptable. 
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2. The costs of a possible mistake are high. 
3. The situation is not routine, but new and/or complex. 
The critical thinking instruction starts with an initial instruction in the method, that is, an 
introduction to the theoretical background and the practical relevance of the approach, an 
explanation of the four critical thinking steps, and a demonstration of critical thinking being 
applied in a situation assessment and decision problem. It continues with prompts being 
provided during practice to initiate the critical thinking processes in learners. The instruction 
method has been empirically tested in several studies (e.g., Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 
1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996, but these studies were less than optimal. They were 
conducted in simplified training environments and compared the performance of critical 
thinking participants with the performance of participants who did not receive any training at 
all. Since only performance during learning was assessed, it was not established whether 
critical thinking instruction had differential effects on retention and transfer. Cohen and 
colleagues  (Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996) attributed the benefits of critical 
thinking instruction to acquiring an appropriate decision making strategy. When students are 
taught critical thinking skills, they are less likely to make the typical mistakes in making 
judgments, such as giving in to confirmation bias (i.e., interpret new information so that it 
complies with the things you already know) or neglect of probability (i.e., disregard 
probability when making a decision under uncertainty; Halpern, 1997). Thus, they will show 
better overall performance on judgment and decision making tasks. In addition, it is expected 
that participants also gain a deeper, more abstract level of understanding of the task content 
that specifically enables them to solve decision problems different from the learning 
problems on both a superficial and structural level. Critical thinking instruction may facilitate 
processes such as self explanation and reflection, that have been proven to enhance learning 
and transfer (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Ferguson-Hessler & de Jong, 1990; 
Lee & Hutchinson, 1998; Nathan, Mertz, & Ryan, 1994).   
Contextual Interference  
As stated before, contextual interference may enhance generalization and abstraction 
processes (De Croock, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998) and as a result, improve transfer 
across tasks or knowledge domains. Contextual interference may be manipulated by the 
scheduling of learning tasks. Blocked task sequences, that is, sequences of learning tasks 
organised in blocks, with only one variation of a task being practised in each block (e.g., 
AAA-BBB-CCC), have low contextual interference. These have often been found to lead to 
higher performance during the learning phase than random practice schedules (e.g., A-B-C-
B-C-A-A-C-B), which have high contextual interference (Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1998, 
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2002). However, random practice schedules often result in better retention and transfer of 
skills to related tasks and situations (Greeno, 1964; Magill & Hall, 1990). These effects of 
high contextual interference have been observed and studied extensively in the learning of 
motor tasks (Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 2007; Lee & Magill, 1983; Shea & Morgan, 1979; 
Simon, 2007), but are not unique to the motor learning domain. Studies on learning 
procedural tasks (Carlson, 1989; Carlson & Schneider, 1989; Carlson, Sullivan, & Schneider, 
1989; Carlson & Yaure, 1990), cognitive operational tasks, such as interacting with automatic 
teller machines (Jamieson & Rogers, 2000), foreign vocabulary learning (Jacoby, 1978; 
Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1998, 2002), logical rules (Schneider, Healy, Ericsson, & Bourne, 
1995), learning problem solving from worked examples (Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994), or 
learning high-level cognitive tasks, such as troubleshooting a complex simulation of a 
chemical plant (De Croock et al., 1998), demonstrate that contextual interference is a 
general phenomenon that applies to a variety of learning tasks and contexts.  
In their explanation of the effect of contextual interference, Shea and Morgan (1979) 
formulated the elaboration hypothesis: Under high contextual interference conditions, 
different procedures for different task variations need to be kept in mind simultaneously, 
thus providing the opportunity to identify similarities and differences between task variations 
and those procedures. This more elaborate and distinctive processing of the tasks would 
facilitate remembering of the appropriate procedure for each task because more details of 
the original context may serve as retrieval cues.  
A different explanation is provided by Lee and Magill (1983). In their reconstruction 
hypothesis, they theorize that under conditions of high contextual interference, the 
appropriate procedure for each task variation has to be reconstructed from (long term) 
memory since not all procedures can be kept active simultaneously. In the repetitive 
presentation of the same task variation in a blocked schedule, these repeated 
reconstructions are not necessary because the solution to the problem is still readily 
available. Thus, repeated reconstructions are considered to be responsible for the learning 
advantages of random practice schedules.  
Yet another account for the differences in acquisition and transfer performance following 
random or blocked practice schedules is given by R. A. Schmidt and Bjork (1992). They claim 
that the additional information processing demands in a random practice schedule are the 
retrieval processes: A random practice schedule prevents learners from generating a stable 
set of responses for a particular task, and forces the learner to retrieve necessary 
information for task performance from memory. This practice in the process of retrieving 
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information from memory is critical for test performance, therefore learners will perform 
better on transfer tests after a random practice schedule.  
For all three hypotheses there are empirical data that seem to support them. However, it is 
still unclear which one is most viable (Li & Wright, 2000; Wulf & Shea, 2002). What all these 
‘extra processing’ hypotheses have in common, though, is that they mainly explain the benefits 
of random practice over blocked practice. Although this implies some consideration of the 
constraints of blocked practice, focussing primarily on the latter could lead to a fourth 
explanation for the contextual interference effect. Deteriorated learning in a blocked 
practice schedule compared to a random practice schedule might also be due to an illusion of 
competence learners experience as a result of the repetitive presentation of the same type of 
task (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). Illusions of competence may inhibit search and application of 
alternative task strategies and so block gaining a deeper level of understanding (Kornell & 
Bjork, 2007). As a consequence, transfer test performance, particularly far transfer, will be 
hampered in a blocked sequence compared to a random sequence. In a random sequence 
illusions of competence are far less likely to occur, for learners are confronted each time 
with a new task.  
Conclusion  
Learning complex judgment and decision making requires two types of skill: (1) development 
of recognition skills based on subject matter expertise representing the relevant cues, the 
criterion value that needs to be predicted, and the interrelationship between the different 
cues and the criterion value (i.e., a mental model), and (2) higher order critical thinking skills 
(called metacognitive skills in the recognition/metacognition model of Cohen, Freeman, & 
Wolf, 1996) that serve to increase understanding. Designing training for complex judgment 
and decision making skills using critical thinking instruction and contextual interference is 
expected to improve learning and transfer through elaboration of the task content (e.g., by 
generalisation, discrimination, or abstracting away from it).  
Although both critical thinking and contextual interference are believed to increase transfer 
of judgment skills, the former has not yet been studied in well-controlled experiments and 
the latter has not yet been studied with complex judgment tasks. Moreover, the combined 
effects of critical thinking and contextual interference have not yet been investigated. The 
next chapters present the results of several field and laboratory studies that investigated the 
effects of critical thinking instruction (Chapter 3), contextual interference (Chapter 4), and 
their combination (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 presents a general discussion of all conducted 
studies. 
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Abstract 
Two field studies on the effects of critical thinking instruction were conducted. 
Study 1 investigated the effects on learning and near transfer and Study 2 
investigated the effects on far transfer. Participants received a training with 
scenario-based exercises in both simplified (Study 1) and high fidelity (Study 2) 
learning environments. In both studies, half of the participants received instruction 
in critical thinking. The other half received the same exercises, but without critical 
thinking instruction. After the training, test scenarios were administered to both 
groups. Results provide support for the hypotheses that critical thinking 
instruction has a positive effect on transfer test performance and that this benefit 
is greater for far transfer performance than for near transfer performance. 
Studies on decision strategies of experienced decision makers in complex environments (e.g., 
military command and control, crisis management) have shown that experienced decision 
makers not only have a large body of knowledge, but also apply deliberate problem-solving 
strategies that differ significantly from novices’ strategies (Endsley, Hoffman, Kaber, & Roth, 
2007). When faced with a complex and unfamiliar problem, experienced decision makers 
collect and critically evaluate the available evidence, seek for consistency, and test 
assumptions underlying their assessment of the problem (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006). 
Novices, on the other hand, tend to focus and act upon single observations without trying to 
build and test a comprehensive model of the situation. Usually, expert problem solving 
strategies are not part of a training program for professional decision making; they are only 
acquired as a result of experience in the field (Anderson, 1993; Klein, 1998; Lipshitz, 1993).  
Cohen and colleagues (Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson 1997; Cohen, Freeman & Wolf, 1996; 
Freeman & Cohen, 1996) developed an instructional concept that combined instruction 
aimed at acquisition and application of domain knowledge with instruction on explicit 
problem-solving strategies: Critical thinking instruction. Several evaluation studies showed 
promising results: After critical thinking instruction, trainees considered more observations, 
identified more cause and effect relations, provided better arguments, and made better 
decisions according to subject-matter experts (e.g., Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; 
Freeman & Cohen, 1996). However, these studies had some limitations. First of all, they 
were conducted in simplified learning environments. Moreover, performance of participants 
who received critical thinking instruction was compared to that of participants who did not 
receive any instruction or practice at all. And finally, it was not established whether critical 
thinking instruction had differential effects on near and far transfer performance. Therefore, 
we conducted two field studies on the effects of critical thinking instruction on learning and 
transfer of complex judgment and decision making in tactical command.  
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Complex Judgment and Decision Making in Tactical Command 
Military commanders are responsible for the preparation, execution, and management of 
military operations in unstable and complex conditions. They have to decide on deployment 
of sensor systems, weapons, and personnel. Therefore, they have to assess situations 
quickly, identify threats, and make assumptions on intentions of enemies and other parties to 
predict what will happen and what consequences their own actions will have. In the present 
studies, the effects of critical thinking instruction are tested in two training programs for 
tactical command and control: (1) ground-to-air defence operations for air force officers, 
and (2) naval air and surface warfare for naval officers.  
In ground to air operations, the task is to plan and manage the deployment of several 
weapon systems (e.g., Patriot, Hawk, Stinger) to provide air defence for a geographical area 
or specific object of interest. The decision maker has to prioritize elements in the area s/he 
has to defend, taking into account enemy intent, weapons capabilities, current capacity, and 
so forth. During an engagement, the decision maker may have to revise the defence plan, 
command the damage repair according to priorities, command casualty transportation, 
decide which targets to engage, and so forth. 
In naval air and surface warfare the decision maker has to plan manoeuvres of his or her 
frigate in such a way that the ship provides maximum defence against air and surface threats 
to an object of priority (e.g., another ship carrying humanitarian goods) while still continuing 
the mission. The decision maker has to monitor the situation, anticipate threats, decide on 
deployment of passive or active sensor systems, command forward patrol and 
reconnaissance aircrafts (e.g., helicopters), decide on engagements of targets, and so forth.     
In summary, these tactical command and control tasks are complex and dynamic, set in 
quickly changing, uncertain and interactive environments. Education and training programs in 
military command and control used to focus mainly on decision making through analysis and 
deductive reasoning (Czerwinsky, 1996). Commanders were taught to collect lots of 
information, generate all possible options, and weigh probabilities and expected effects to 
select an optimal course of action. Such an approach, however, is based on the false 
assumption that the environment is largely stable, predictable, and knowable. And the 
operational environment of military command and control simply does not provide enough 
time to decision makers to generate and weigh all options. Experienced decision makers 
apply other reasoning strategies that enable them to quickly chose an appropriate option. 
This is not necessarily the optimal course of action, but one that usually suffices (Johnson & 
Raab, 2003). Therefore, naturalistic decision making research has provided different 
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approaches for learning command and control decision making (Cohen, et al., 1997; Klein, 
McKloskey, Pliske, & Schmidt, 1997). These approaches focus on teaching reasoning 
strategies of experienced decision makers and on making the implicit information processing 
explicit.    
Critical Thinking Instruction 
Experienced decision makers differ from novices on two aspects. First, experienced decision 
makers have more and better organized knowledge of the domain they are working in. Their 
knowledge is represented and organized in cognitive schemas, that is, networks of abstract 
mental concepts (Anderson, 1977; Bartlett, 1932; Iran-Nejad, 2000; Minsky, 1975; Neisser, 
1967; Rumelhart, 1975). These schemas facilitate recognition and categorization of problem 
situations, thus guiding the identification of an appropriate response (Graesser, Gordon, & 
Sawyer, 1979). The second difference between novices and experienced decision makers 
concerns the (meta)cognitive processes that guide and critically review the decision-making 
process (Cohen, et al., 1996; Ertmer & Newby, 1996). In their assessment of the situation, 
experienced decision makers integrate the available information into its context, which may 
include elements such as the history of events leading to the current situation, and the 
intentions, capacities, and opportunities of others. Novices, in contrast, often consider 
aspects of the situation separately and independently (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). 
Furthermore, experienced decision makers critically test assumptions, actively search for 
inconsistencies or conflicts, and reflect upon their own decision strategies (Olsen & 
Rasmussen, 1989).   
Critical thinking instruction aims at teaching both recognition-primed decision making and 
(meta)cognitive techniques (Cohen, et al. 1996; Freeman & Cohen, 1996)This requires 
exposure to many prototypical problems during learning along with specific instruction in 
critical thinking. Typical critical thinking instruction involves an explanation of the decision 
making process before the learning phase. In addition, an instructor will typically prompt the 
learner to reflect on his or her cognitive strategy and initiate one of the critical thinking 
steps during the learning phase. These steps include (Freeman & Cohen, 1996): 
Creating a story: A story is a comprehensive assessment of the situation, in which all existing 
evidence is incorporated and explained and assumptions are made about uncertain aspects of 
the situation. Past, present and future are addressed in the story. The purpose of story 
building is to keep participants from assessing situations solely on isolated events. Instead, 
participants are taught how they can integrate the available information into its context. For 
example, consider a naval commander aboard a frigate intercepting a brief emission of an 
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enemy helicopter radar. The frigate is in silent mode, that is, no sensor or weapon systems 
are active, only passive sonar is deployed since presence of an enemy submarine is expected, 
and the frigate is sailing in a shipping lane thus mimicking a freighter. Novice commanders 
may focus solely on the interception, interpret that as a sign that a helicopter is close by and 
has detected their frigate, and has switched off its radar to approach the frigate to make a 
visual identification. The result of that interpretation would probably be that novice 
commanders immediately go into an active state, deploying all sensors and weapons, planning 
to destroy the helicopter before it can communicate with other enemy forces. However, 
experienced commanders may also consider information from sonar, the fact that it is the 
first interception, and the intentions and capacities of the enemy. They may reason that 
although the helicopter has detected their presence, it is probably still at a large distance and 
is probably classifying all ships in the shipping lane. These considerations combined with the 
absence of any enemy submarines on the sonar images may lead the experienced 
commander to decide not to go into active state, but remain silent and unsuspicious.  
Testing a story: Participants are instructed how to identify inconsistency and uncertainty, and 
how to adjust or refine their story by deliberate testing. They have to correct these 
problems by collecting more data, retrieving knowledge from memory, making assumptions 
about the missing piece of the story, or by resolving conflicts in the argumentation. 
Consider, again, the frigate commander having intercepted the helicopter radar emission. 
The experienced commander remains silent because s/he expects the helicopter to be at a 
large distance, not within weapons range. S/he has to identify gaps in the story, one of which 
is information on the helicopter’s distance. By closely monitoring the bearing of the 
interception, seeing how it changes, combining that information with the exact moment the 
emission is lost and with information on the position of other ships, s/he can estimate its 
likely location. The commander may also identify conflicting evidence: The presence of the 
helicopter is usually an indication that an enemy submarine is in the area, however, the sonar 
images show nothing. To resolve this conflict, s/he may manoeuvre the ship in such a way 
that another sonar image is got that might reveal an enemy submarine. Or s/he may assume 
that the helicopter is on a regular reconnaissance mission instead of being a forward sensor 
for a submarine.  
Evaluating a story: After a story is constructed and tested for gaps, it should be evaluated for 
its plausibility. The decision maker has to take a step back, identify critical or hidden 
assumptions and play the devil’s advocate by falsifying these assumptions, that is, explaining 
how an assumption can be false and build an alternative story. In our previous example, the 
commander had estimated the helicopter’s likely position. S/he will also time the period 
between two intermissions to estimate at what distance from any ship the helicopter 
 46 Chapter 3 
switches off its radar. The idea behind this approach is that the helicopter is building a 
tactical picture of the area, and switches off its radar when it approaches a ship for a visual 
identification and classification. At a certain point, the commander may assume that the 
frigate may be next to be identified and classified. Based on these assumptions on the 
helicopter’s speed, it can be calculated that the helicopter may be within weapons range 2 
minutes after it switches off its radar. Thus, s/he plans to go active state two minutes after 
the next time the helicopter switches off its radar. This will give the opportunity to engage 
the helicopter before the helicopter can communicate the frigate’s position and direction to 
other enemy forces. S/he realizes that the critical assumption is the current distance of the 
helicopter. By monitoring its behaviour, the commander has assumed that the helicopter is 
now close, but this may be wrong. S/he looks at the tactical picture of the area and tries to 
find out whether the helicopter’s manoeuvring history can also be explained in another way 
that would have resulted in the helicopter now being at a greater distance. S/he also realizes 
that evasive manoeuvres and an engagement with an enemy submarine must be planned if 
the helicopter for some reason cannot be destroyed.  
Quick test: Critical thinking is not always appropriate. Decision makers have to evaluate the 
time available and the consequences of their actions. In stressful situations such as those 
often encountered by professional decision makers, there is usually little time to spare. The 
decision makers should act immediately unless the risk of delay is acceptable, the costs of 
errors are high (i.e., when lives are at stake), and/or the situation is non-routine or  
problematic (i.e., complex or novel problems). For easy, routine problems that are not 
important, critical thinking is not expected to increase decision quality (Cohen et al., 1998). 
In our example throughout the steps above, the experienced commander initially took the 
extra time to continue to assess the situation and took action when s/he thought there was 
an urgency to keep the initiative. The novice commander, however, went to active state 
immediately, probably only to find that the helicopter was too far to engage. But the active 
sensor and weapon systems may have warned the enemy helicopter and possible submarines 
in the area of the frigate’s presence, making it a so called ‘sitting duck’. In this case, s/he 
could have delayed a decision, and the cost of error was high. 
Cohen and colleagues (Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996) 
attributed the benefits of critical thinking instruction to participants having acquired an 
appropriate decision making strategy. In addition to that, we assume that critical thinking 
instruction may help participants acquire more elaborate knowledge representations, or 
schemas, and a deeper, more abstract level of understanding of the learning content because 
it forces learners to compare different pieces of information, identify cause and effect 
relationships between events, and differentiate between observations and assumptions (cf. 
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Biggs, 1985; Berthold, Nückles & Renkl, 2007; Russel, 2002; Schön, 1983). In short, learners 
are required to focus not just on the superficial aspects of situations or on mere 
observations, but on the underlying structures and causes. This enhanced understanding, in 
turn, should lead to better transfer. 
Transfer of Training 
Transfer-of-training refers to the transfer of skills learned under specific conditions or from 
practicing a specific task to other conditions or tasks (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Roscoe & 
Williges, 1980). Transfer of knowledge and skills from the learning tasks to professional tasks 
is usually the ultimate goal of education and training programs. A distinction is often made 
between near and far transfer. Near transfer tasks share structural features but differ on 
superficial or surface features from the learning tasks, whereas far transfer tasks differ from 
the learning tasks on both surface and structural features (Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Quilici & 
Mayer, 1996). Thus, the degree of transfer depends on the degree to which task activities 
call upon the same skill, but also on the learner’s level of understanding of a task (Detterman 
& Sternberg, 1993; Mayer & Wittrock, 1993). Near transfer can be obtained if the learner 
knows what to do, whereas far transfer is usually possible only if the learner also knows 
when and why s/he needs to do that (Van Merriënboer, 1997). To gain such deep 
understanding required for far transfer, a process of abstraction is needed, from knowledge 
of the task at hand to a higher level of knowledge, for instance, of the general principles of a 
domain or the general procedures for performing a certain type of task (Van Merriënboer & 
Paas, 1990).  
Critical thinking instruction is expected to deepen understanding of learning materials, and 
consequently improve far transfer performance because, as stated before, learners are 
required to focus not on the superficial aspects of situations or on mere observations, but 
on the underlying structures and causes. Also, with critical thinking instruction learners are 
expected to explain their reasoning processes and reflect on them. And several studies have 
shown that processes such as self-explanation may enhance reflection and consequently 
transfer (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 
1994; Ferguson-Hessler & de Jong, 1990; Lee & Hutchinson, 1998; Renkl, 1997). 
The Present Studies 
We present two field studies that assess the effects of critical thinking instruction on 
learning complex judgment tasks. The first study focuses on skill acquisition and transfer 
performance of individual air force officers learning to command and control ground-to-air 
defence operations. The second study investigates naval (petty) officers learning to command 
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and control air and surface warfare. It is hypothesized that critical thinking instruction has a 
positive effect on transfer performance and that this benefit is greater for far transfer 
performance than for near transfer performance. 
Study 1 
The first study was conducted in the Tactical Command Station of a ground-to-air defence 
battalion of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The effects of critical thinking instruction on 
learning processes and transfer test performance were assessed. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixteen officers of the Royal Netherlands Air Force volunteered to participate in the 
experiment (15 male, 1 female; age M = 32.31, SD = 3.81). Prior experience in ground-to-air 
defence tasks ranged from 1 to 5 years (M = 3.69, SD = 2.14). The supervising project officer 
matched participants according to their tactical education and experience, and assigned 
participants from each pair randomly to the critical-thinking condition (n = 8) or the control 
condition (n = 8).  
Materials  
Practice scenarios. Six practice scenarios were developed. The paper-and-pencil scenarios 
encompassed a starting point and a description of events specified in time. They required the 
participants to make assessments of the geographical area, identify priorities in the area to 
be defended, assess threats and perform certain actions such as planning engagements of 
targets, deploy sensor and weapon systems, make a damage repair plan, plan for 
transportation of casualties, reallocate resources, and make new priorities. The scenario 
leader introduced the scenario events and provided outcome-feedback at moments that 
were pre-specified in the scenario. Events were specified in minutes from the start (e.g., X = 
start scenario, event Y starts at X + 5 min., event Z at X + 10 min., etc.) and feedback 
moments were specified relative to participants’ reaction to events (e.g., after participants’ 
assessment of the situation, provide feedback on the accuracy of their assessment). Feedback 
referred to the accuracy of the participants’ assessment and actions, and if necessary 
information on the correct assessment or action to continue the scenario. Participants 
played the role of battle captain and the scenario leader played all other roles. Each scenario 
took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
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Critical thinking instruction. In the critical thinking condition, participants received a paper-
based instruction explaining the four steps in the process of critical thinking: (1) creating a 
story of the situation, (2) testing that story, (3) evaluating its plausibility and finding 
alternative stories (i.e., contingency plans), and (4) quick consideration of the need to decide 
immediately or spend more time on the critical thinking process. Participants were 
instructed to think aloud during the whole process (see Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Besides 
the textual explanation, a hand-out with a graphic representation of the four steps (see 
Figure 1) and two demonstrations of critical thinking in real-world situations were provided. 
In each demonstration, two scenario leaders showed how critical thinking should be used in 
the scenarios; one of them played the role of participant (i.e., the battle captain) and one of 
them played the other roles.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Critical thinking steps (cf. Freeman & Cohen, 1996) 
1. Story Building 
try to explain all your observations in one 
comprehensive story, take into account 
history, intentions of other parties 
involved, expectations for future events. 
Quick Test
Do I have time? 
Is it a new and complex situation?
Are the consequences great or 
far reaching? 
If yes: continue the steps of 
critical thinking 
3. Evaluation
The Devil’s Advocate tells you that your story is 
wrong, based on faulty assumptions. 
Make up alternative assumptions and a new story 
that can also explain all observations. 
Is the alternative more plausible than the original? 
2. Story Testing
Do I have all necessary information? 
Is there conflict in the evidence? 
Do I need to make assumptions? 
Do I need to change my story? 
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Feedback during the execution of the practice scenarios consisted of process feedback, 
focused on the participant’s decision strategy and critical thinking processes. Instructors 
closely monitored participants’ verbalizations of their decision making processes and 
matched that with the required assessments as specified in the scenario. If they identified 
gaps or missing or wrong assessments, they would ask open ended questions to encourage 
the participant to critically reflect on his own decision process, acknowledge the gap, or the 
missing or wrong assessment, and take recuperating actions. These open ended questions 
focused on one of the four steps of the critical thinking process (see Table 3.1). When 
participants were adequately engaged in the critical thinking process, that is, following the 
steps of critical thinking and arriving at good assessments, instructors only made encouraging 
remarks (e.g., ‘very well’ or ‘I understand’). Instructors did not provide any other feedback 
or information  
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Table 3.1 
Example Questions for Instructors to Encourage Participants to Engage in the Steps in Critical 
Thinking 
Critical thinking step Questions 
1. Story building Can you describe what the situation is?  
What caused all this?  
What are the intentions of the enemy and why? 
What do you expect to happen? 
2. Story testing What additional information do you need to 
make a reasonable prediction?  
Did you identify any conflicting evidence?  
Did you incorporate all aspects of the situation, 
all observations, in your story? 
3. Story evaluation Could there be an alternative explanation for all 
these observations?  
How would the situation unfold if this alternative 
explanation were true? 
4. Quick test Why do you need to make a decision 
immediately? 
Is the situation complex and are consequences 
great or far reaching? 
Can you spend more time thinking? 
 
Control group instruction. The control group participants were given a presentation of the 
organization and projects of the research institute where two of the authors worked to 
engage them during the critical thinking instruction of the other group. They also received a 
short introduction regarding the purpose and context of the tactical practice scenarios they 
were about to receive. Furthermore, two example scenarios were demonstrated by two 
scenario leaders. These demonstration scenarios were being played as normal command 
post exercises, without critical thinking. During execution of the practice scenarios, they 
received outcome feedback only (e.g., “that was a good assessment”, “you made the right 
decision”, “you should not have done that”, “the rules of engagement do not allow you to 
take these actions”, “you failed to destroy the target”). 
Test scenarios. The test scenarios were two paper-and-pencil scenarios in which the 
participants again played the role of battle captain and the scenario leader covered all other 
roles. Neither outcome feedback nor process feedback was provided during the execution 
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of the test scenarios. Participants were required to think aloud during execution of the test 
scenarios.  
Procedure  
The experiment had a duration of approximately 10 hours, and was run in five sessions of 
approximately two hours each. The sessions were held at five consecutive days with one or 
two participants at the same time. In the first session, participants of the critical thinking 
group received the critical thinking instruction followed by the two demonstration scenarios 
including the critical thinking steps. The control group was given the general presentation 
and witnessed the same two demonstration scenarios but without critical thinking. In the 
three subsequent learning sessions (sessions 2-4), two practice scenarios were played each 
time. The participants played the role of battle captain and a scenario leader played the 
other roles. There was a 15-minute break between the scenarios. The order of the 6 
practice scenarios was randomly selected from all possible scenario sequences for each 
participant. Consecutive practice scenarios were facilitated by different scenario leaders, that 
is, participants practiced three scenarios with one scenario leader and the other three with 
another scenario leader. The participants were instructed to think aloud during the 
scenarios to provide the scenario leader insight into the decision strategies and critical 
thinking process, enabling the evaluation of participants’ performance and provision of 
feedback when a required assessment was made or missed. About two to three times during 
a practice scenario, the scenario leader provided outcome or critical thinking feedback, 
during which the scenario was ‘frozen’ for a few minutes. Scoring of the performance 
indicators was done continuously during the scenario, while the behaviour was exhibited by 
participants. The performance measures were graded at the end of a scenario.  
In the fifth session two test scenarios were played. Order and assignment of the test 
scenarios to scenario leaders was balanced. Again, all participants were asked to think aloud, 
however, no feedback was given. Participants’ verbalizations of their decision and critical 
thinking strategies were used to grade performance.  
Data Analysis 
Two types of performance measures were gathered during the practice and test scenarios: 
(1) outcome measures to assess the quantity and quality of the end result, and (2) process 
measures, to evaluate the strategies, steps and procedures used to accomplish the task. 
Conform the ‘Command and Control Performance Measurement Tool’ (Van Berlo & 
Schraagen, 2000), performance indicators were specified for both the outcomes and process 
measures, enabling the evaluators to observe and interpret the decision making processes 
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and outcomes. These performance indicators were formulated concisely, and were easily 
scored in terms of whether the behaviour was observed or not; this was indicated in the 
respective column (Yes or No) and an overall grading (ranging from 1 = very poor, to 10 = 
excellent) for that performance measure was determined. Prior to the experiment proper, 
scenario leaders had used the results of a pilot-study (using the same scenarios but with 
different participants) to reach a common understanding of assigning grades. 
Quality of actions and contingency plans were used as outcome measures. Performance 
indicators for quality of actions were: Concise, unambiguous, stating the right priorities, 
conform expert solution, and logical result of the assumptions and argumentation. 
Performance indicators for quality of contingency plans involved: The availability of 
contingency plans, concise plan, unambiguous plan, and a logical result of (expressed) 
conflicting evidence or weak assumptions underlying the plan. Information processing and 
argumentation served as process measures. For information processing, the performance 
indicators were: Being able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information, 
recognition of conflicting evidence, and identification of missing information. For 
argumentation, the performance indicators were: Recognition of cause and effect 
relationships, incorporation of history of the situation, explication of expectations for the 
future, plausibility of these expectations, recognition of uncertainties, and differentiation 
between observations and assumptions.  
These performance measures, that is, information processing, argumentation, quality of 
actions, and quality of contingency plans, were graded on a scale between 1 to 10. The 
grades were used for analysis of the effects of critical thinking instruction on trainee 
performance during learning scenarios and on the test. 
Results 
The grades for information processing, argumentation, quality of actions, and quality of 
contingency plans were calculated for each participant for the six learning scenarios and the 
two test scenarios, and were analyzed using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for two 
dependent samples. The members of the matched pairs differed in instruction (critical 
thinking vs. no critical thinking). In all analyses reported below, a significance level of .05 is 
set.  
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Figure 3.2: Median performance grades of participants of the critical thinking group and the 
control group in the learning phase. 
Learning phase  
The median scores for information processing, argumentation, action plan quality, and 
contingency plan quality during the learning phase are presented in Figure 3.2.  Wilcoxon 
signed ranks tests showed that critical thinking had an effect on quality of contingency plans 
(Z = -2.20, p = .03), with participants in the critical thinking group reaching higher grades 
(Mdn = 5, range = 2) than participants in the control group (Mdn = 1, range = 9). However, 
no significant effects were found of critical thinking in the learning phase on information 
processing (Z = -1.17, p=.09), argumentation (Z = -1.14, p=.26), or quality of actions (Z = -
1.00, p=0.32).  
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Figure 3.3: Median performance grades of participants of the critical thinking group and the 
control group in the test phase. 
Test phase  
The median scores for information processing, argumentation, action plan quality, and 
contingency plan quality on the test are presented in Figure 3.3. As with the results of the 
learning phase, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed an effect of critical thinking instruction 
on contingency plan quality (Z = 2.21, p = .03), with participants in the critical thinking group 
performing better (Mdn=4.5, range = 3) than participants in the control group (Mdn=1.5, 
range=7). Again, no effects were found of critical thinking on information processing (Z =  -
1.16, p=.25), argumentation (Z = -1.61, p=.11), and quality of actions (Z = -1.13, p=.235).  
Discussion 
Participants in the critical thinking condition already developed better contingency plans than 
the control group during the learning phase, and this carried over into the test phase. This is 
easy to understand, since the critical thinking approach aims to make participants aware of 
critical assumptions, conflict, and missing information in their situation assessment, and to 
prepare for contingency. Although the other performance measures failed to show 
statistically significant effects of critical thinking, a trend can be observed from Figures 3.2 
and 3.3 suggesting that participants from the critical thinking group obtained slightly higher 
grades than the control group. The results suggest that the critical thinking approach might 
be a useful tool for improving the quality of learning tactical judgment, as earlier explorative 
studies indicated (e.g. Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996; Freeman & Cohen, 1996; Klein et al., 
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1997). However, this study had some limitations. First, scenario leaders’ scoring may have 
been biased by their knowledge of the instructional intervention and the design of the study. 
Second, the effect of the instruction has been studied in a simplified task environment. 
Eventually, critical thinking skills need to be applied in the real world. For reasons of transfer 
it is necessary to investigate whether critical thinking skills can be successfully trained in 
high-fidelity task environments. Finally, in this study we did not investigate whether there 
were differential effects of critical thinking instruction on near and far transfer test 
performance. When critical thinking leads to better and more general understanding of the 
learning material, we would expect that benefits of this type of instruction and support 
would be stronger on a far transfer test than on a near transfer test. Hence, a second study 
was conducted to address these issues, using independent assessments and a more realistic 
task environment. 
Study 2 
This study was conducted in the domain of anti air warfare and anti-surface warfare at the 
Operational School of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Teams of one participant officer and one 
petty officer played single ship / single threat scenarios in a high fidelity tactical simulator.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen officers of the Royal Netherlands Air Force volunteered to participate in the 
experiment (15 male, 1 female; age M = 36.08, SD = 6.07), with prior sailing experience 
ranging from 2 to 17 years (M = 10.23, SD = 5.57). The supervising project officer matched 
participants according to their tactical education and experience, and assigned participants 
from each pair randomly to the critical-thinking condition (n = 8) and control condition (n = 
8).  
Materials  
Practice scenarios. Four practice scenarios of approximately 120 minutes each were 
developed. Two of these scenarios were paper-and-pencil scenarios, two were scenarios to 
be run in the high fidelity tactical simulator. All four scenarios had a similar structure: They 
encompassed a starting point, contained events specified in time, and required assessments 
or actions by the participants. The scenario leader introduced the scenario events and 
provided feedback at moments that were marked in the scenario. Events were specified in 
minutes from the start (cf. Study 1) and feedback moments were specified relative to 
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participant’s reaction to events (cf. Study 1). Feedback referred to the accuracy of the 
participant’s assessment and actions, and if necessary, provided information on the correct 
assessment or action to continue the scenario. Participants played the role of principal 
warfare officer and assistant and the scenario leader played all other roles. The assistant was 
responsible for tactical picture compilation, interacted with the operators or the system to 
gather all information and presented that graphically to the principal warfare officer, who 
interpreted the picture and decided on which actions (manoeuvres, engagements) to take. In 
working together, assistant and warfare officer usually came to a common understanding of 
the situation and necessary actions to take, however, sometimes they disagreed. In such 
cases, the principal warfare officer was responsible and decided on the course of action.  
Critical thinking instruction. Similar to Study 1.  
Control group instruction. Similar to Study 1. 
Transfer tests. Two transfer test scenarios were developed: A near transfer test and a far 
transfer test. The near transfer test scenario was a variation of the learning scenarios, 
involving the same background information, the same environment, but with a different 
timing and direction of threatening events.  
The far transfer test scenario was different from the learning scenarios on both superficial 
and structural level. The scenario’s historical, political, and geographical background differed 
from the learning scenarios, and furthermore, the nature and timing of events was different. 
Both near and far transfer test scenarios were played in the tactical simulator. No feedback 
was provided during execution of the test scenarios.  
Procedure  
Prior to the experiment proper, instructors assigned to critical thinking teams were 
extensively briefed on the critical thinking instruction, as well as on how to support the 
teams in the application of the critical thinking processes. Instructors assigned to control 
teams were not informed about the concept of critical thinking. They were told to support 
the teams as they would normally do in practice scenarios. The experimenter also briefed 
the two independent subject matter experts who were evaluators for the transfer test 
performance evaluation on the scoring procedure and how to use the scale. Evaluators were 
not informed about the concept of critical thinking instruction nor of the purpose and design 
of the study. Again, scenarios of a pilot study were used to arrive at a common 
interpretation of performance indicators. 
 58 Chapter 3 
The experiment had a duration of approximately 20 hours and was run in five daily sessions 
of approximately four hours. In the first session, participants received the instruction to play 
the scenarios as a normal command and control exercise. Participants of the critical thinking 
group received a critical thinking tutorial, followed by a demonstration in which the 
instructor showed how critical thinking should be used in the scenarios. The control group 
witnessed a presentation of the research institute where two of the authors work. After 
that, a demonstration was given of the same example scenario as the critical thinking group 
received, now being played as a normal command and control exercise without critical 
thinking. In the subsequent learning sessions (2 and 3), two practice scenarios were played 
each day, with a 1-hour break in between the scenarios. The order of practice scenarios was 
predefined and scenario leaders were assigned to scenarios since specific expertise was 
required for specific scenarios. Participants were asked to think aloud during the scenarios 
to provide the scenario leader insight into the decision strategies and critical thinking 
process, enabling the evaluation of participants’ performance and provision of feedback when 
a required assessment was made or missed. About four to five times during a practice 
scenario, the scenario leader provided outcome or critical thinking feedback, and ‘froze’ the 
scenario for a few minutes. Scoring of the performance indicators was done during the work 
on the scenario. The performance measures were graded four times during the scenario; 
markers in the scenario description prompted the instructor to do this.  
On the fourth session the test scenarios were played in the simulator. Order of the test 
scenarios was balanced per session: Thus, half the participants played a far transfer test prior 
to the near transfer test, and the other participants first played the near transfer test and 
then the far transfer test.  Evaluators were assigned to specific scenarios on the basis of their 
expertise. All participants were asked to think aloud but no support or feedback was given 
to them. An independent subject matter expert evaluated participants’ individual 
performance on these test scenarios on the basis of the verbalizations of participants. The 
expert received the scenarios on paper. He scored the performance indicators during 
execution of the scenario when a participant exhibited the behaviour, and specific markers in 
the scenario description prompted the evaluator to grade all performance measures at that 
particular moment, four times per scenario.   
Data analysis 
The same outcome and process measures as in Study 1 were used. In addition, performance 
with respect to time management (performance indicators were being aware of deadlines, 
taking into account the importance and impact of mistakes, knowing when to think more, 
anticipate events) and team skills were graded. The performance indicators for team skills 
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were adequate information exchange, concise and unambiguous communication, and 
teammates showing supportive behaviour and initiative/leadership (cf. Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, 
Acton, & McPherson, 1998). Because instructors and evaluators were used to using the 
official NATO 4-point scale, it was decided to use this 4-point scale which ranges from 1 = 
Unsatisfactory, 2 = Marginal, 3 = Satisfactory, to 4 = Excellent (see Van Berlo & Schraagen, 
2000).  
Participants were graded individually, thus, within the same team of principal warfare officer 
and assistant, both could get a different grade on one of the performance measures in the 
same scenario. Again, the performance indicators served merely as support for the 
evaluators, only the grades on the six performance measures (measured 4 times per 
scenario) were taken for data analysis.   
Results  
The median grades on information processing, argumentation, quality of action plans, quality 
of contingency plans, time management, and team processes were calculated for each 
participant for the four learning scenarios, the near transfer test, and the far transfer test. 
They were analyzed using Wilcoxon signed ranks test for two dependent samples. The 
members of the matched pairs differed in instruction (critical thinking, no critical thinking). In 
all analyses reported below, a significance level of .05 is set.  
 
Figure 3.4: Median performance grades of participants of the critical thinking group and the 
control group in the learning phase. 
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Learning Phase 
The median grades on information processing, argumentation, time management, quality of 
actions and contingency plans, and team skills for both conditions during the learning phase 
are presented in Figure 3.4. Analysis of the median grades on information processing (Z = -
1.71, p = .09), argumentation(Z = -1.67, p = .09), quality of actions( Z = -1.80, p = .07), and 
quality of contingency plans (Z = -0.63, p = .53) showed no significant effects of critical 
thinking in the learning phase. Critical thinking did improve time management and team skills 
(Z = -2.37, p = .02, and  Z = -2.21, p = .03, respectively). Participants in the critical thinking 
group received higher grades for time management (Mdn =3.5 , range=2 ) and for team skills 
(Mdn= 4, range=1 ) than participants from the control group (Mdn = 2, range =2  and Mdn 
=2.5 , range = 2, for time management and team skills respectively). 
 
Figure 3.5: Median performance grades of participants of the critical thinking group and the 
control group on the near transfer test 
Near Transfer Test  
Figure 3.5 presents the median grades for information processing, argumentation, time 
management, quality of actions and contingency plans, and team skills for both conditions in 
the near transfer test. None of the performance measures were affected by critical thinking 
instruction, as was shown by the results from the Wilcoxon signed ranks test: information 
processing (Z = -0.33, p=0.739), argumentation (Z = -0.82 , p=.41), time management( Z =-
.68 , p=.49), quality of actions (Z = -.65, p= .52), quality of contingency plans (Z = -.81, 
p=.416), and team skills (Z = -1.55, p = .12).  
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Figure 3.6: Median performance grades of participants of the critical thinking group and the 
control group on the far transfer test. 
Far Transfer Test 
The median grades on information processing, argumentation, time management, quality of 
actions, quality of contingency plans, and team skills for both conditions on the far transfer 
test are presented in Figure 3.6. Critical thinking instruction had an effect on information 
processing, Participants from the critical thinking group received significantly higher grades 
on information processing (Z = -2.33, p = .02 ), argumentation (Z = -2.06, p = .04), time 
management (Z = -2.27, p =.02) and team skills (Z = -2.16, p = .03), but there was no 
difference between the groups for quality of actions (Z = -1.84, p = .07) and quality of 
contingency plans (Z = -1.61, p = .11). The grades for information processing were Mdn =3.5 
range =1 and Mdn =3, range =2; for argumentation  Mdn =3, range =0, and Mdn =2, range =3; 
for time management Mdn =3, range =1, and Mdn=1.5, range=3; and for team skills Mdn =3.5 
range =1 and Mdn =3, range =2, for critical thinking group and control group respectively. 
Discussion 
In line with our hypothesis, this study showed clear beneficial effects of critical thinking 
instruction on far transfer: Participants from the critical thinking group received higher 
grades on the majority of the performance measures. During the learning phase critical 
thinking mainly improved time management and team skills. This might be a result from 
asking participants to think aloud, which provided their teammate with information on their 
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reasoning. This in turn may have facilitated the support given to each other or the efficiency 
of the communication.   
This study investigated whether critical thinking instruction could benefit learning in dynamic, 
complex task environments such as a high fidelity tactical simulator. Although the dynamic 
and interactive nature of the simulator environment sometimes provided participants with 
little opportunity to reflect critically on their own task behaviour, it was possible to apply 
this approach by means of in-team discussion and by the introduction of pauses in the 
simulator scenarios. Still, we assume that it is important that participants are provided with 
ample opportunity to get acquainted with the critical thinking approach prior to the 
simulator sessions, which we achieved by starting with paper-and-pencil scenarios.  
General Discussion 
The two field studies reported in this paper examined the effects of critical thinking 
instruction on learning complex judgment and decision making in tactical command and 
control. With respect to participants’ performance, it was hypothesized that: (1) critical 
thinking instruction yields better learning outcomes than training without critical thinking, 
that is, higher test performance, and (2) this performance benefit is greater for far transfer 
than for near transfer test performance.  
Regarding the first hypothesis, there is a trend in both studies for participants who received 
critical thinking instruction to perform better on the test than participants who received no 
critical thinking instruction before and during the exercises, but this did not always reach 
significance. With regard to the second hypothesis, the results from Study 2 show that 
participants from the critical thinking group performed better than the control group on the 
majority of the performance measures in the far transfer test, but not on the near transfer 
test.  
Our findings are consistent with those of studies on the effects of critical thinking instruction 
on command and control decision making (Freeman & Cohen, 1996), nursing (Forneris & 
Peden-McAlpine, 2006), medical diagnosis (Klein, 1998), and management (Yeo, 2007). We 
have shown that critical thinking instruction can also be successfully applied in learning 
complex judgment skills in interactive and dynamic high fidelity simulators and renders better 
results than merely practicing complex judgment in these simulator environments.  
The performance gains can probably be partly ascribed to participants being able to apply a 
better decision strategy as a result of the critical thinking instruction. As Halpern (1997) has 
shown, when students are taught critical thinking skills, they are less likely to make the 
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typical judgment mistakes caused, for example, by confirmation bias or failures to reason 
adequately about probabilities. Thus, they will show better overall performance on judgment 
and decision making. However, the fact that we found critical thinking instruction to have a 
greater effect on far transfer test performance than on near transfer test performance may 
be an indication that apart from having acquired a better decision making strategy, 
participants have also gained more general and abstract schemas and thus a deeper 
understanding of the task content, which enables them to solve new decision problems that 
differed from the learning problems on both a superficial and a structural level. An 
interesting question for future research remains what aspects of critical thinking instruction 
affect the deeper level of understanding that was observed, or whether it is the entire 
instruction. In the Introduction, we already mentioned possible candidates, namely self-
explanation and reflection, but on the basis of our results we cannot pinpoint exactly which 
process is responsible for the improved level of comprehension after critical thinking 
instruction. It might be interesting to provide participants with only reflection or self-
explanation prompts during a learning task, to disentangle possible separate effects on 
learning and transfer.  
In combination with previous studies, our field studies seem to warrant the implementation 
of critical thinking instruction in education and training programs. However, implementation 
studies with larger numbers of participants are needed to provide answers to important 
questions, concerning how critical thinking instruction can be integrated into an existing 
curriculum, what instruction and practice observers/trainees need for successful application, 
and what the long term effects are of critical thinking instruction on judgment and decision 
making performance.  
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Abstract 
The effects of contextual interference on learning a complex judgment task are 
investigated. In Experiment 1, participants’ judgment accuracy on a retention test 
was higher after a random practice schedule (high contextual interference) than 
after a blocked or operational practice schedule. Experiment 2 demonstrated that 
judgment on a transfer test was also better after a random practice schedule than 
after a blocked schedule. Both experiments failed to show any effects of 
contextual interference on performance during learning. These findings show that 
the benefits of contextual interference for retention and transfer, which have 
been reported in the literature for perceptual-motor tasks, also  apply to learning 
complex judgment skill, and moreover, may be achieved without detrimental 
effects on performance during practice.  
Most educational programs aim to achieve two major goals: Adequate post training 
performance (retention) and transfer to related tasks and situations. However, very often, 
those goals are confused with enhancing performance and speed of skill acquisition during 
training. Research has shown that the opposite is often true: Interventions that enhance 
performance during training may have detrimental effects on retention and transfer 
performance, and conversely, instructional manipulations that degrade performance during 
skill acquisition may support the long term goals of training (for an overview, see Schmidt & 
Bjork, 1992).  
An example of the latter is increasing contextual interference, that is, interference between 
learning tasks, through a practice schedule where different variations of the learning tasks 
are sequenced randomly as opposed to sequenced in separate blocks (Shea & Morgan, 
1979). Increasing contextual interference may degrade performance during the learning 
phase but lead to better post training performance and transfer (Lee & Simon, 2003). This 
technique has mainly been studied in motor tasks (Brady, 1998; Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 
2007; Guadagnoli & Lee, 2004; Lee & Magill, 1983; Magill & Hall, 1990; Shea & Morgan, 1979; 
Simon, 2007). However similar findings have been obtained with for example procedural 
tasks (Carlson, 1989; Carlson & Schneider, 1989; Carlson, Sullivan, & Schneider, 1989; 
Carlson & Yaure, 1990), cognitive operational tasks, such as interacting with automatic teller 
machines (Jamieson & Rogers, 2000), language learning (Jacoby, 1978), foreign vocabulary 
learning (Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1998, 2002), learning logical rules (Schneider, Healy, 
Ericsson, & Bourne, 1995), learning problem solving from worked examples (Paas & Van 
Merriënboer, 1994), and troubleshooting tasks (De Croock, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 
1998).  
Only few studies have been conducted in the past to investigate the effects of task 
interference on learning complex judgment and decision making, in which the goal is to learn 
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the complex relationships between several phenomena and predict the value of a distal 
variable (e.g., clinical diagnosis, weather forecast, threat assessment; Brehmer, 1973, 1977, 
1979). Moreover, these studies measured performance during training, not on retention or 
transfer tests. Since training principles that are effective with relatively simple tasks are not 
necessarily effective for complex tasks as well (Wulf & Shea, 2002), research is required to 
establish whether contextual interference is effective for retention and transfer in learning 
this type of complex judgment task. It is important to establish the most optimal training 
sequence for such tasks, because of the far reaching consequences that for example wrong 
clinical diagnoses or military judgments may have (Hogarth, 1980). Therefore, the present 
study explores the effects of contextual interference on learning and transfer of complex 
judgment tasks.  
Complex Judgment Tasks 
In the numerous choices or judgments people make every day, two distinct classes can be 
identified: Value judgments, which express their preferences, and predictions, which reflect 
what they expect to happen (Hogarth, 1980). Value judgments encompass for example a 
choice for one house over another, or one pair of shoes over another. Predictions concern 
future outcomes, such as for example expectations regarding how someone might react to 
what you say or do, or who will win the next presidential elections. In this study we focus 
on predictive judgment tasks.  
Making predictive judgments usually involves combining different information sources and 
considering many factors. For example, a judgment concerning the value of a stock portfolio 
next year is the result of a consideration of factors such as the current value of the stock, 
the results of the companies that have been invested in, industry trends, interest rates, 
political climate, et cetera. The accuracy of a prediction depends on the extent to which all 
relevant factors, or cues, and their relative importance for the judgment, have been correctly 
identified. Learning to make accurate predictive judgments is difficult, because often we 
cannot know all factors involved, causing the environment in which these judgments have to 
be made to appear as probabilistic (Brunswik, 1943).  
A well known research method for studying how people learn these complex judgment tasks 
is the multiple cue probability learning experiment (MCPL; Brehmer, 1980; Hammond, 
Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinman, 1975; Smedslund, 1955), also known as multidimensional 
functional learning (MFL; Hoffman, Earle, & Slovic, 1981). The basic elements of MFL learning 
tasks are: A criterion (something a learner must learn to predict), cues (information a 
learner is given from which to make a prediction), and feedback. Learning the relationships 
between one or more cues and the criterion requires that the learner compares different 
situations, or different tasks, with respect to the cue values and the criterion.  
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Contextual Interference 
Contextual interference may be manipulated by the scheduling of learning tasks. Blocked 
task sequences, that is, sequences of learning tasks organised in blocks, with only one 
variation of a task being practised in each block (e.g., AAA-BBB-CCC), have low contextual 
interference. These have often been found to lead to better performance during training 
than random practice schedules (i.e., high contextual interference; e.g., A-B-C-B-C-A-A-C-B; 
see e.g., Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 2002). However, random practice schedules often 
result in better retention and transfer of skills to related tasks and situations (Greeno, 1964; 
Healy et al., 2002). As mentioned above, these beneficial effects of high contextual 
interference have been observed in a variety of domains and tasks. 
To explain the benefits of contextual interference for retention and transfer, several 
hypotheses have been formulated, such as the elaboration hypothesis (Shea & Morgan, 
1979), the reconstruction hypothesis (Lee & Magill, 1983), and the retrieval hypothesis 
(Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). The major line of argument of these hypotheses is that in a random 
practice schedule, learners are challenged to compare the different procedures associated 
with the different tasks, whereas in a blocked schedule, only one task procedure has to be 
kept in mind during a block of tasks, forsaking the need for extra processing activities such as 
elaboration, reconstruction, or retrieval of procedures from long-term memory. These extra 
processing activities lead to abstraction, that is, richer mental representations and more 
general knowledge about principles and procedures. In MFL, high contextual interference 
conditions may encourage learners to abstract cue-criterion relations from the learning 
tasks, whereas in low contextual interference conditions learners may rely on memory of 
specific cue-criterion observations from prior learning tasks, without attempting to abstract 
the underlying relationships between cues and criterion. Therefore, it is expected that 
although low contextual interference conditions may enhance performance during the 
learning phase of an MFL task, high contextual interference conditions will eventually lead to 
better retention and transfer. 
Operational Practice Schedules  
Studying the effects of different practice schedules on learning and transfer of complex 
judgment and decision making skills may also provide insight into the effectiveness of the 
train as you fight paradigm that is being widely applied in decision making training programs 
(e.g., for military command and control, crisis management, and general leadership and 
management). In this training approach, the real world sequence and frequency of events 
serves as a basis for the scheduling of practice events (i.e., operational practice schedule). 
Within the research community, it is often considered an ineffective training methodology 
for several reasons (Farmer, Van Rooij, Riemersma, Jorna, & Moraal,1999). One of the 
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objections against train as you fight is that it may not provide the opportunity to practice rare 
or unusual tasks, which may yet be critical to effectively deal with emergency situations. 
However, if the real world sequence of events increases contextual interference because it is 
in random order, it might lead to adequate post training performance. Little research has 
addressed the effects of the train as you fight or operational practice schedules, especially in 
comparison with random or blocked schedules (e.g., Beaubien, Palev, Shadrick, Ennis & 
Jacklin, 2006; Lussier, Shadrick & Prevou, 2003).  
The experiments presented here investigate the effects of different practice schedules on 
learning, retention (Experiment 1 and 2), and transfer (Experiment 2) of complex judgment 
skills. It is hypothesized that a blocked practice schedule yields better performance during the 
learning phase, whereas regarding learning outcomes, measured in terms of retention and 
transfer test performance, random (Experiment 1 and 2) and operational (Experiment 1) 
practice schedules yield better performance than a blocked practice schedule.  
Experiment 1 
This experiment investigates the effects of random, blocked, and operational practice 
schedules on performance during the learning phase and on retention tasks. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-four individuals volunteered to participate in this experiment (21 male, 33 female; age M 
= 21.0 years, SD = 2.9), with no prior knowledge or experience concerning the experimental 
tasks. Participants received 32 Euros for their participation in the experiment and could gain 
an additional bonus of between 0 and 12 Euros, based on their level of performance during 
the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to the blocked practice schedule (n = 
18), random practice schedule (n = 18), and operational practice schedule (n = 18). 
Materials  
Learning tasks. Three sets of 6 cases were developed. One dealt with injury cases, one with 
damage cases, and one with traffic cases. Participants were presented with one set of cases, 
and had to prioritize each case on the urgency for the police to deal with it. Case type was 
balanced over conditions, that is, in each condition 6 participants worked on injury cases, 6 
participants worked on damage cases, and 6 participants worked on traffic cases. Priorities 
depended on the values of two different cues. One cue had three possible values, the other 
cue had two different values, yielding six combinations of cue values. For injury cases these 
cues were: (1) condition of victim (light injury, heavy injury, dead) and (2) weapon (firearm, 
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no firearm). For damage cases the cues were: (1) level of damage (light, heavy, irretrievable) 
and (2) nature of the crime (burglary, arson). For traffic cases the cues were: (1) nature of 
the offence (speeding, driving without insurance, drunk driving) and (2) history (first time, 
recidivist). Tables 4.1, 4. 2, and 4.3 present the priority scores for each combination of cue 
values.  
Table 4.1 
Cue Values, Priority Scores, and Presentation Frequency in the Operational Practice Schedule of 
the Injury Cases  
Condition of victim Weapon Priority score Presentation 
frequency in 
operational practice 
schedule 
Light injury No Firearm 18 45% 
 Firearm 32 5% 
No firearm 48 25% Heavy injury 
Firearm 62 10% 
No firearm 78 3% Dead 
Firearm 100 12% 
 
The cases were presented one by one on a computer screen (see Figure 4.1). Each 
participant received 96 learning tasks (i.e. each of the 6 cases was presented 16 times) . The 
first 6 tasks were introduced by a short description of the crime, the subsequent 90 tasks 
were presented as a set of cue values only. On the lower half of the screen, beneath the 
presentation of the case, a slide bar was presented covering the whole range of priority 
scores (1-100). Using the computer mouse, participants could manipulate an indicator on the 
slide bar to mark the priority of the case. 
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Table 4.2 
Cue Values, Priority Scores, and Presentation Frequency in the Operational Practice Schedule of 
the Damage Cases  
Nature of crime Level of damage Priority score Presentation 
frequency in 
operational practice 
schedule 
Light 19 18% 
Heavy 25 31% 
Burglary 
Irretrievable 31 21% 
Light 49 3% 
Heavy 55 12% 
Arson 
Irretrievable 61 15% 
 
Table 4.3 
Cue Values, Priority Scores, and Presentation Frequency in the Operational Practice Schedule of 
the Traffic Cases  
Nature of offense History Priority score Presentation 
frequency in 
operational practice 
schedule 
Speeding First time 4 30% 
 Recidivist 20 45% 
First time 24 7% Uninsured 
Recidivist 40 3% 
First time 44 9% Drunk driving 
Recidivist 60 6% 
 
Feedback during the training session consisted of a second slide bar with the indicator at the 
position of the true priority score. This feedback slide bar was presented above the first 
one, immediately after participants had indicated their priority score. The bonus that 
participants had earned ( 125.196
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continuously visible on the screen.  
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Figure 4.1: Presentation of a case, including feedback on its true priority, on the participant’s 
computer screen in Experiment 1 (translation, original in Dutch). 
Practice schedules. In the random practice condition, the cases were presented in a fully 
randomized order (without replacement) and each combination of cue values was presented 
an equal number of times. Thus, during the 96 learning tasks, each of the six combinations of 
cue values (i.e. each case) was presented 16 times. In the blocked practice condition, each 
combination of cues also appeared 16 times in total. The learning tasks in the first block of 
the learning phase (12 tasks) were sequenced in such a way that only one cue (the cue with 
3 values) changed value from one task to the next, and the value of the second cue was kept 
constant. In the second block (12 tasks), the second cue had changed value, and again only 
the first cue changed value from one task to the next. In the third block (8 tasks) the first 
cue was kept constant and the second cue (with two values) changed value from one task to 
the next. In the fourth block (8 tasks), the value of the first block had changed, and again a 
sequence of tasks was presented where only the second cue changed value from one task to 
the next. In the fifth block (8 tasks), the value of the first cue changed again, and the second 
cue changed value from one task to the next. In the sixth block (24 tasks) and seventh block 
(24 tasks) two cues simultaneously changed their values from one task to the next. The 
Nature of the crime Arson
Level of damage  Light 
  ReadyBonus: € 2.20 
Trial 16 
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operational task sequence was realized by a random order of tasks in which some tasks 
were more likely to be presented to participants than others (i.e., the higher the occurrence 
in real-life situations, the more likely the case was to be presented). See Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 
4.3, for the probability of selecting each case in the operational sequence.  
Test tasks. The retention test tasks consisted of a random selection of 24 tasks from the 
learning tasks, presented in random order that was the same for each participant. Each 
combination of cue values was presented approximately four times. No feedback was given 
during the test. 
Procedure  
The experiment had a duration of approximately 1.5 hours and was run in sessions with at 
most six participants. Before the experiment started, participants read a short instruction 
explaining how to rate the priority of the cases by moving the indicator on the slide bar. 
Then, the experimenter assigned each participant to a computer and started the learning 
phase. After participants had practiced the 96 learning tasks, they had a short break of 
approximately 10 minutes after which they completed the 24 tasks of the retention test. For 
both the learning phase and the test phase, participants could take as much time as they 
needed. 
For each task in the learning phase and the test phase, participants’ deviation score, defined 
as the absolute difference between the estimated priority and the true priority of the task, 
was automatically stored in a logfile. For each participant, time-on-task for the total session 
(learning phase and test together) was logged.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 4.4 presents the judgment performance (i.e., deviation) scores in the learning phase 
and the test phase per condition. Time-on-task did not differ between conditions, F(2, 51) < 
1, p > .20, and type of cases (injury, damage or traffic) did not affect the deviation scores, 
F(2, 51) < 1, p > .20. In the analyses reported here, a significance level of .05 is set, and 
partial eta-squared is reported as a measure of effect size.  
An ANOVA on the mean deviation scores during the learning phase showed that practice 
schedule did not have a significant effect on performance during the learning phase, F(2, 51) 
= 0.94, ns. That is, contrary to our expectations, participants in the blocked condition did 
not perform better than participants in the random or operational conditions during the 
learning phase.  
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Table 4.4 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Deviation Scores for All Conditions in Experiment 1 
Blocked practice 
schedule 
Random practice 
schedule 
Operational practice 
schedule 
 
M SD M SD M SD 
Learning phase  7.25 3.88 6.15 2.17 6.01 2.61 
Retention test  5.48 2.81 3.12 1.84 4.58 2.41 
 
Regarding the mean deviation scores during the test phase, an ANOVA did show a significant 
effect of practice schedule, F(2, 51)= 4.46, MSE = 5.71, p = 0.02, !p2  = 0.15. Post hoc Tukey 
tests indicated that in line with our expectations, participants who followed a random 
practice schedule performed better (i.e., lower deviation scores) on the retention test than 
participants who followed a blocked practice schedule (|Mdiff | = 2.36, p = 0.01). The other 
differences between conditions were not statistically significant. 
Concluding, the expectation that a blocked practice schedule generates better performance 
during learning than a random or operational practice schedule was not confirmed by our 
results. This may be due to the presentation of a large amount of learning tasks, such that 
participants in both the blocked and the random condition reached similar performance 
levels at some point during the learning phase, masking possible initial positive effects of a 
blocked practice schedule. There are some other studies that also failed to find effects of 
practice schedule on performance during learning: Whereas some failed to find effects on 
test performance as well (e.g., French, Rink, & Werner, 1990; Jones & French, 2007), others 
did show effects on test performance, in line with our results (Immink & Wright, 1998; Ollis, 
Button, & Fairweather, 2004; Wrisberg & Liu, 1991). That is, we did find the expected 
benefits for participants in the random condition over the blocked condition on the 
retention test. However, the operational condition did not outperform the blocked practice 
group. When practice tasks were presented in an operational order, that is, randomly but 
with some cases being presented more frequently than others, the benefits of a random 
practice schedule for retention performance disappeared. Because some cases appear more 
often than others in an operational schedule, not all cases that were presented in the test 
had been trained to the same extent, which might explain why the operational schedule did 
not outperform the blocked schedule as expected. So even though operational schedules are 
advocated by some practitioners as a means of providing more realistic training scenarios 
while increasing contextual interference, and as a consequence post training performance, 
this experiment shows that a ‘normal’ random schedule is to be preferred in terms of 
reaching good retention performance.  
  Effects of Practice Schedule 77 
In this experiment, only effects on retention were measured. However, the aim of many 
education or training programs is to attain transfer of learning, that is, the adequate 
application of skills or knowledge acquired under specific conditions or with specific tasks in 
different tasks or conditions (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Roscoe & Williges, 1980). It has been 
argued that transfer is higher following a random practice schedule than following a blocked 
schedule, because in a random schedule participants may compare different tasks 
continuously, which may not only lead to a deeper understanding of the relationships 
between the different cues and the criterion, but also to abstract knowledge of how to 
approach this type of task (Wulf & Shea, 2002). Therefore, Experiment 2 investigates the 
effects of a random and blocked practice schedule on transfer. Because an operational 
practice schedule did not generate any performance difference during learning and on the 
test in the first experiment, this condition is excluded from Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment studies the effects of random and blocked practice schedules on 
performance during learning and on transfer of complex judgment skill.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
Sixty-four participants (32 male, 32 female; age M = 22.0 years, SD = 4.4) were randomly 
assigned to two groups that received either random practice or blocked practice. Their 
prior level of schooling ranged from senior vocational education to university masters level. 
All participants received 32 Euros for their participation in the experiment and could gain an 
additional bonus of between 0 and 12 Euros, based on their level of performance during the 
learning phase.  
Materials  
Learning tasks. Learning tasks consisted of 32 descriptions of crimes. Each crime had to be 
prioritized on the urgency for the police to deal with it. Priorities could be determined on 
the basis of the dichotomous values on four different cues that occurred in each crime 
description: (1) the condition of the victim (injured, dead); (2) the use of a weapon (no 
firearm, firearm); (3) the nature of the crime (burglary, violence/holdup), and (4) available 
information concerning the perpetrator (description, known to the police). Table 4.5 
presents the priority scores for each combination of cue values. Two tasks were developed 
for each of the 16 combinations of cue values, resulting in 32 tasks.  
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Table 4.5   
The Effect of Cue Values on the Priority Score in Experiment 2  
Condition 
of victim 
Use of weapon Nature of crime Information on 
perpetrator 
Priority score
Injury (10) No Firearm (0) Burglary (0) Description (0) 10 
   Known to police (8) 18 
  Violence/holdup (12) Description (0) 22 
   Known to police (8) 30 
 Firearm (4) Burglary (0) Description (0) 14 
   Known to police (8) 22 
  Violence/holdup (12) Description (0) 26 
   Known to police (8) 34 
Death (43) No Firearm (0) Burglary (0) Description (0) 43 
   Known to police (19) 62 
  Violence/holdup (29) Description (0) 72 
   Known to police (19) 91 
 Firearm (9) Burglary (0) Description (0) 52 
   Known to police (19) 71 
  Violence/holdup (29) Description (0) 81 
   Known to police (19) 100 
 
The crime descriptions were presented to the participants one by one on a computer 
screen (see Figure 4.2). The task was presented on the upper half of the screen. Below that, 
the four cues and possible cue values with tick boxes as well as a blank space for 
participants’ estimate of the priority of the crime (to be given as a numerical value between 
1 and 100) were presented. The correct cue values had to be ticked before entering priority 
scores. Feedback in terms of the true priority of a crime was presented on the screen after 
completion of each crime. The bonus that participants had earned 
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In the night of 25 april sounds the burglary alarm of a 
juwellers store at 14 Bakkerstraat in Apeldoorn . 
Security guard Jan Potter responds. When he arrives at 
the scene he sees a young man with dark skin and hair, 
dressed in blue overalls, carrying a burlap sack. The 
young man jumps trough a broken window onto the 
street, and runs in eastern direction. Potter immediately 
chases after him. All of a sudden, the young man turns 
towards Potter and fires a gun. Two bullets hit Potter in 
the stomach, and he has to cease his pursuit. When 
Potter is taken to the hospital, doctors confirm that he 
is stable and out of danger, but he is crippled for life. 
Inspection of the juwellers store reveals that the burglar 
has captured many valuable diamonds.  
 
Ready 
12 Trialnumber 
Condition of victim  ! Dead     ! Injured 
Nature of the crime  ! Burglary     ! Violence/hold up 
Available information  ! Known to police     ! Witness Description 
Use of weapon   ! Firearm     ! No firearm 
Bonus     €2.20 
" Priority 
 
Figure 4.2:Presentation of a case on the participant’s computer screen in Experiment 2 
(translation, original in Dutch). 
Practice schedules. In the random practice group, the task order was determined by random 
selection without replacement from the 32 available tasks. In the blocked practice group, the 
tasks in the first block of 8 tasks focused the participants’ attention on the most influential 
cue, namely, the condition of the victim. The tasks in the second block (tasks 9-16) 
simultaneously varied the values of the condition of the victim and one other cue. The tasks 
in the third block (tasks 17-24) simultaneously varied the values of the condition of the 
victim and of the two other cues not yet used in the second block. The tasks in the fourth 
and final block (tasks 25-32) simultaneously varied the values of the condition of the victim 
and the three other cues.  
 80 Chapter 4 
Transfer test. The test tasks consisted of eight transfer tasks, that is, tasks that were similar 
to the training tasks in structural features (same combination of cues) but different with 
regard to surface features (cover stories). The test tasks were presented in a random order 
that was the same for all participants. No feedback was given during the test. 
Procedure 
The experiment lasted about one hour, with at most four participants per session. Before 
the experiment started, participants read an instruction explaining how to rate the priority 
of the tasks, and two exemplary task descriptions were discussed. Then, the experimenter 
assigned each participant to a computer and started the learning phase. The test was 
conducted a few minutes after the last task in the learning phase was finished. For each task, 
participants’ deviation scores, defined as the absolute difference between the estimated 
priority and the true priority of the task, were automatically stored in a log file. Time-on-
task for the total session (learning phase and test) was logged for each participant. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 4.6 presents the mean deviation scores per condition in the learning phase and the 
test phase. Time-on-task did not differ between conditions, t(62) = -.26,  p > .20. In the 
analyses reported below, a significance level of .05 is set, and Cohen’s d is reported as a 
measure of effect size.  
Table 4.6 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Deviation Scores for the Conditions in Experiment 2 
Blocked practice schedule  Random practice schedule  
M SD  M SD 
Learning phase 15.30 5.70  16.89 6.39 
Transfer test 15.09 6.92  10.78 6.82 
 
A t-test for independent samples showed that as in Experiment 1, practice schedule did not 
have a significant effect on performance during the learning phase, t(62) = -1.05, ns. In line 
with our expectations, participants in the random practice schedule outperformed (i.e., 
lower deviation scores) participants in the blocked practice schedule on the transfer test, 
t(62) = 2.51, p = 0.01, d  = 0.63. 
In sum, this experiment examined the effects of random and blocked practice schedules on 
learning and transfer of a multidimensional functional learning task. We expected that a 
blocked practice schedule would generate equal or better performance than a random 
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practice schedule during the learning phase. However, as in Experiment 1, performance 
during the learning phase was equal, but not better in the blocked practice schedule 
compared to the random practice schedule. This unexpected finding is further discussed in 
the general discussion. In line with our expectations, this second experiment showed that a 
random practice schedule not only results in better retention as was shown in Experiment 1, 
but also in higher transfer test performance than a blocked schedule.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of contextual interference on 
learning, retention and transfer of complex judgment tasks and to investigate the 
effectiveness of an operational practice schedule stemming from the train as you fight 
paradigm (i.e., a random schedule but with some tasks being more likely to be presented 
than others, based on their frequency of occurrence in reality). For this, a multidimensional 
functional learning experiment (Experiment 1) was conducted in which participants had to 
learn how to judge the priority of crimes on the basis of a set of cues. We had expected that 
the blocked group would outperform both random groups during training and both random 
groups would perform better during the retention test. Indeed, we found that the random 
group performed better than the blocked group on the retention test. However, 
performance of the operational group did not differ from performance of the other groups 
and no differences were found on performance during the learning phase. A second 
experiment comparing random and blocked schedules on learning and transfer, also failed to 
find an effect during the learning phase, but did show beneficial effects of a random schedule 
for transfer. 
Regarding the finding that blocked practice did not result in better performance during the 
learning phase, we initially thought this might be due to the large number of tasks in 
Experiment 1. However, we also failed to find differences during the learning phase in 
Experiment 2, in which the learning phase consisted of much less tasks, so this is not the 
most likely explanation. As mentioned before, other studies have noted lack of performance 
differences during the learning phase with blocked and random practice schedules, but 
sometimes these studies also failed to find effects on a test (e.g., French et al., 1990; Jones & 
French, 2007). However, some other studies also failed to find an effect of contextual 
interference on performance during learning, but did find positive effects on transfer, as in 
this study. Such findings were reported in a study conducted by Wrisberg and Liu (1991) on 
comparison of contextual interference levels on learning of badminton skills. They 
demonstrated better retention and transfer under random practice but no difference was 
found between groups during acquisition. And using knot-tying skills in professional fire-
fighters training, Ollis et al. (2004) found that the detriment to acquisition performance as a 
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result of high contextual interference was not as great as previous laboratory findings would 
suggest. Similarly, Immink and Wright (1998) failed to find any performance detriment during 
acquisition of a movement task as a result of a random practice sequence. They 
hypothesized, in accordance with the reconstruction hypothesis by Lee and Magill (1985), 
that a blocked schedule benefits performance during acquisition because it obviates the need 
to replan movements between tasks, whereas participants in a random schedule need to 
engage in these time consuming replanning activities. They subsequently showed that when 
participants in a random schedule were given sufficient time in between learning tasks to plan 
the upcoming response, the acquisition benefit often apparent with blocked practice 
disappeared, while keeping the benefits for random practice for transfer performance. As 
participants could work self-paced, a similar mechanism might underlie the lack of 
performance difference between random and blocked schedules we found in the acquisition 
of the highly cognitive task of complex judgment skill. However, whether this assumption is 
correct remains an open question, but an interesting one for future research.  
As mentioned above, the retention test results in our first study showed an improvement as 
result of a random practice schedule compared to a blocked schedule, and no improvement 
after having followed an operational practice schedule. This operational schedule, 
representative of the “train as you fight” paradigm, failed to show higher performance 
compared to a blocked schedule. Therefore, as intuitively attractive as operational schedules 
may seem, a random practice schedule seems preferable over an operational schedule. 
In considering the practical implications of our results, we have to take into account our 
operationalization of a blocked practice schedule, which is somewhat different from blocked 
schedules as they are traditionally designed in contextual interference studies. In a blocked 
schedule, the sequence of learning tasks is such that only one task variation per block is 
practiced (e.g. block 1: AAAAAA, block 2: BBBBB, where A and B are variations of the 
learning task). As we stated in the Introduction, in complex judgment, the task for the judge 
is to predict a future outcome on the basis of a few cues. In learning to predict such future 
outcomes, the judge has to learn which cues are relevant (cue selection), how each cue 
relates to the criterion to be predicted, and whether cues are intercorrelated (i.e., cue-
criterion functions). Thus, the creation of blocks for these complex judgment tasks is less 
straightforward than it would be for less complex tasks. The blocked schedules in our 
experiments were such that in the first blocks one cue changed value from one task to the 
next. In terms of predicting the future outcomes, this would not seem to be a blocked 
sequence as the resulting sequential tasks are different task variations. However, in terms of 
the learning task, that is, to learn cue-criterion functions, participants are provided the 
opportunity to learn the effects of one cue-criterion function before moving on to learning 
the next. And in the last blocks, two (or more) cues changed value from one task to the 
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next, providing the opportunity to learn the interaction between the cues. As such, this is a 
blocked practice schedule, and moreover, one that resembles real world training approaches 
for complex judgment and decision making. For example, sonar image operators, in a typical 
training program for identifying and judging sonar contacts, first learn how a sonar image 
depends on ocean bottom patterns, then how water temperatures influence sonar image, 
and only after that, how ocean bottom pattern and water temperatures interact and how 
that influences the sonar image (see e.g., www.mosaichydro.com). The data presented here, 
however, show that such training programs better present the trainee with a random 
sequence of tasks, leaving it to the trainee to identify and categorize cues and cue-criterion 
relationships. 
To conclude, this study showed that high contextual interference benefits both retention 
and transfer of complex judgment skill, and that these effects may occur without detrimental 
effects on performance during practice. This study focused on retention and near transfer 
test performance, i.e. the transfer test tasks were different from the learning tasks on a 
superficial level, but not on a deep structural level. Far transfer of complex judgment skills,  
when the transfer test tasks also differ from the learning tasks on a deep, structural level, 
was not investigated, but remains an interesting subject for future research.  
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Chapter 5 
The Effects of Practice Schedule and Critical 
Thinking Instruction on Learning and Transfer of a 
Complex Judgment Task 
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Abstract 
Many studies have shown beneficial effects of random over blocked practice on 
transfer of learning, even though blocked practice often leads to better 
performance during the learning phase. In a 2 x 3 factorial experiment (N = 120) 
with the factors practice schedule (random, blocked) and critical thinking 
prompts (proactive, retrospective, none), this study investigates whether this also 
applies to complex judgment tasks, and whether critical thinking prompts can 
enhance the effectiveness of those practice schedules. It is hypothesized that 
retrospective prompts yield best transfer in a random practice schedule, whereas 
proactive prompts yield best transfer in a blocked schedule. In line with our 
hypothesis, a blocked schedule led to better performance than random practice 
during learning, but not on the transfer test, where a random schedule was 
beneficial. The hypothesized interaction effect was also found: whereas 
retrospective critical thinking prompts have surplus value in a random schedule, 
transfer test performance following a blocked schedule is enhanced through 
proactive critical thinking prompts.  
 
Within current practices of training and education, much effort is invested in measures that 
enhance training efficiency and performance. Unfortunately, many of these measures focus 
on performance gains during the training. This can be problematic, because those measures 
do not always contribute to, or may even deteriorate, the transfer of knowledge and skills 
from the learning tasks to the operational tasks. A technique that has been shown to lead to 
better transfer is contextual interference. However, this technique has mainly been studied 
in relatively simple problems and not in relation with other measures that could establish 
interference, such as prompting critical thinking. The present study investigates the effects of 
contextual interference and critical thinking prompts on learning and transfer of a complex 
judgment task.  
Many studies have shown that conditions that increase contextual interference, such as a 
practice schedule in which several task variations are randomly presented, deteriorate 
performance during the learning phase but lead to better transfer when compared to 
conditions of low interference (Battig, 1972, 1979; Lee & Magill, 1983; Magill & Hall, 1990; 
Shapiro & Schmidt, 1982; Shea & Morgan, 1979). The beneficial effects of high contextual 
interference have been observed in the learning of motor tasks, troubleshooting tasks, 
procedures, and language. It has hardly been studied for learning complex judgment tasks, in 
which the goal is to learn the complex relationships between several phenomena (i.e., 
multidimensional functional learning; e.g., clinical diagnosis, weather forecast, threat 
assessment). However, it is important to do so, because training principles developed on the 
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basis of learning simple tasks do not always generalize to learning complex tasks, as Wulf 
and Shea (2002) concluded after reviewing the literature on learning motor tasks. They 
found, for example, that for retention and transfer of some highly complex motor tasks, 
blocked practice schedules (low contextual interference) were more beneficial than random 
practice schedules (high contextual interference). They hypothesized that the additional 
processing demands imposed by conditions of high interference would compete with the 
essential processing required by the execution of a highly complex task. It is unclear 
whether this is also true for non-motor tasks, because in learning a highly complex judgment 
task, for example, increasing interference by prompting learners to engage in critical thinking 
is known to yield better transfer of judgment skills ( Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; 
Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996; Freeman & Cohen, 1996; Schwalbe, 2004; Helsdingen, Van 
den Bosch, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2008 – Chapter 3). This seems to suggest that 
increasing interference through random practice might also be beneficial for such tasks, and 
a recent experiment by Helsdingen, Van Gog, and Van Merriënboer, 2008 – Chapter 4) 
shows that this is indeed the case, at least with regard to retention and near transfer.  
Effects of contextual interference on far transfer have not yet been studied for complex 
judgment tasks, and effects of critical thinking instruction have mostly been studied in real 
world training programs, that is, with a small number of participants and with low 
experimental control over the sequence of learning events and timing of instructor 
interventions (Cohen, Thompson, Adelman, Bresnick, Shastri, & Riedel, 2000; Helsdingen, 
Van den Bosch, et al., 2008 – Chapter 3). Moreover, the combined effects of critical thinking 
and contextual interference have not yet been investigated. Therefore, as we will argue in 
more detail below, it would be interesting to study whether using the techniques together is 
more effective than using them separately, and whether there is a differential effect of 
critical thinking in conditions of low or high contextual interference.  
Complex Judgment Tasks 
A well known paradigm for laboratory studies into learning complex judgment tasks in 
dynamic and uncertain conditions is multiple cue probability learning (MCPL; Brehmer, 1980; 
Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinman, 1975), also known as multidimensional functional 
learning (MFL; Hoffman, Earle, & Slovic, 1981). The basic elements of MFL learning tasks are: 
A criterion (something a learner must learn to predict), cues (information a learner is given 
from which to make a prediction), and feedback. The learner’s goal is to learn how the 
criterion values relate to the cue values, or, in other words, to predict a future outcome on 
the basis of a few indicators. Consider threat assessment as an example of such a task. 
When an air defence officer needs to judge the threat of an object, such as a hostile 
airplane, s/he has to do so based on a few cues or attributes, such as its speed, position, 
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altitude, direction, and identity. To do this adequately, the defence officer needs to assess 
the value and importance of all cues separately, relative to the other cues, and in 
combination. For example: How important is speed/identity/position? Is speed more 
important than identity when an object is near one’s own position? What constitutes a 
higher threat, an object that is fast and far away but moving towards one’s own position, or 
an object that is slow and very close but moving away? Et cetera.  
Learning the relationships between one or more cues and the criterion requires that the 
learner compares different situations, or different tasks, with respect to the cue values and 
the criterion. This may be realized by instructional interventions that call the learner’s 
attention to different cue and criterion values of different tasks, such as a random practice 
schedule or critical thinking prompts.   
Contextual Interference 
Transfer-of-training refers to the observation that knowledge and skills learned under 
specific conditions or from practicing a specific task, transfer to other conditions or tasks 
(Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Roscoe & Williges, 1980). Transfer of knowledge and skills from 
the learning tasks to the operational tasks is usually the ultimate goal of training programs. A 
distinction is often made between near and far transfer. Near transfer tasks share structural 
features but differ on superficial or surface features from the learning tasks, whereas far 
transfer tasks differ from the learning tasks on both surface and structural features (Quilici 
& Mayer, 1996). Thus, the degree of transfer depends on the degree to which task activities 
call upon the same skill, but also on the learner’s level of understanding of a task (Mayer & 
Wittrock, 1996): Near transfer can be obtained if the learner knows what to do (same use 
of the same—specific—knowledge), whereas far transfer is usually possible only if the 
learner also knows when and why he needs to do that (other use of the same—general—
knowledge; Van Merriënboer, 1997). To gain such deep understanding required for far 
transfer, a process of abstraction is needed, from knowledge of the task at hand to a higher 
level of knowledge, for instance, of the general principles of a domain or the general 
procedures for performing a class or even several classes of tasks (Van Merriënboer & Paas, 
1990). 
Contextual interference may enhance such abstraction processes (De Croock, Van 
Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). To explain the benefits of contextual interference, several 
hypotheses have been formulated, such as the elaboration hypothesis (Shea & Morgan, 
1979), the reconstruction hypothesis (Lee & Magill, 1983), and the retrieval hypothesis 
(Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). The major line of argument of these hypotheses is that in a 
random practice schedule, learners are challenged to compare the different procedures 
associated with the different tasks, whereas in a blocked schedule, only one task procedure 
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has to be kept in mind, forsaking the need for extra processing activities such as elaboration, 
reconstruction, or retrieval of procedures from long-term memory. These extra processing 
activities lead to abstraction, that is, richer mental representations and more general 
knowledge about principles and procedures.  
Empirical data lend support to all three hypothesis above, however, it is still unclear which 
one is most viable (Wulf & Shea, 2002). What all these ‘extra processing’ hypotheses have in 
common, though, is that they mainly explain the benefits of random practice over blocked 
practice. Although this implies some consideration of the constraints of blocked practice, 
focussing primarily on the latter could lead to a fourth explanation for the contextual 
interference effect. Deteriorated learning in a blocked practice schedule compared to a 
random schedule might also be due to an illusion of competence the learner experiences as a 
result of the repetitive presentation of the same type of task (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). 
Illusions of competence may inhibit search and application of alternative task strategies and 
so hinder gaining a deeper level of understanding (Kornell & Bjork, 2007). As a 
consequence, transfer test performance, particularly on far transfer, will be hampered 
compared to a random sequence where illusions of competence do not occur.   
As mentioned before, other instructional interventions, such as critical thinking prompts, 
may lead to similar effects as high contextual interference, thereby preventing illusions of 
competence and enhancing abstraction. 
Critical Thinking Instruction 
Critical thinking aims at teaching recognition based decision making and (meta)cognitive 
techniques that guide and critically review this decision-making process (Cohen, Freeman, & 
Wolf, 1996). Judgment based on recognition of a situation requires exposure to many 
different problems during training. Furthermore, training should foster the (meta)cognitive 
skills that allow decision makers to verify and improve the results of recognition-primed 
decision-making processes, by identifying evidence-conclusion relationships (i.e., arguments), 
critiquing the arguments used to support a conclusion (i.e., identifying incompleteness, 
conflict, or unreliability), and correcting the errors in argumentation (Cohen, Freeman, & 
Wolf, 1996).  
Typical critical thinking instruction involves an explanation of the decision making process 
before the learning phase and an instructor who prompts the learner to reflect on his or 
her cognitive strategy and initiate one of the critical thinking steps during the learning phase 
(see for a more detailed discussion Helsdingen, Van den Bosch, et al., 2008 – Chapter 3). 
Instructors usually deliver prompts at random during the training. In the literature, positive 
effects are mentioned of, for example, planning prompts (Davis, 2003), driving questions 
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(Dochy, 1992; Douglas, Hosokawa, & Lawler, 1988; Morgan & Saxton, 1991; Naidu & 
Bernard, 1992; Orlich, Harder, Callahan, Kauchak, & Gibson, 1994; Rowntree, 1992), and 
deep level reasoning questions (Craig, Sullins, Witherspoon, & Gholson, 2006), all given 
before or during execution of a learning task. However, positive effects of reflection prompts 
provided after task execution have also been reported (e.g., Belland, Glazewski, & 
Richardson, 2007; Davis & Linn, 2000; Van den Boom, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2007; Van 
den Boom, Paas, van Merriënboer & van Gog, 2004).  
In several studies, positive effects of critical thinking instruction on transfer of complex 
judgment skills have been found (Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996; Helsdingen, 
Van den Bosch, et al., 2008 – Chapter 3). One of these studies (Helsdingen, Van den Bosch, 
et al., 2008 – Chapter 3) focused on a group of naval warfare officers learning to identify, 
categorize, and react to naval surface threats in a dynamic and probabilistic simulated 
environment. On the far transfer test, which included real-world events presented in a 
simulated environment, officers who received critical thinking instruction were better at 
selecting relevant information, identifying missing or conflicting evidence, provided better 
arguments for their assessments, were better at planning of their actions in time, , and 
displayed better team skills han officers who received the same amount of judgment training 
but without critical thinking instruction. 
Cohen and colleagues ( Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996) attributed the benefits 
of critical thinking instruction to participants having acquired an appropriate decision making 
strategy. When students are taught critical thinking skills, they are less likely to make the 
typical judgment mistakes that are caused by for example confirmation bias or failures to 
reason adequately about probabilities (Halpern, 1997). Thus, they will show better overall 
performance on judgment and decision making. However, in the study by Helsdingen, Van 
den Bosch, et al. (2008 – Chapter 3) described above, critical thinking instruction was found 
to have effects primarily on far transfer test performance. This may be an indication that 
apart from having acquired a better decision making strategy, participants also gained a 
deeper, more abstract level of understanding of the task content that enabled them to solve 
decision problems that differed from the learning problems on a superficial and a structural 
level. Critical thinking instruction may have this effect because it might facilitate processes 
such as self explanation and reflection, that have been proven to enhance learning and 
transfer (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 
1994; Ferguson-Hessler & De Jong, 1990; Lee & Hutchinson, 1998; Renkl, 1997). Chi et al. 
(1989) attribute the enhanced learning and transfer as a result of self explanation during 
learning tasks, to learners being able to judge their learning progress adequately, not having 
developed an illusion of competence. Learners may develop such an illusion as a 
consequence of several instructional measures that aim to enhance their performance 
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during training. An example might be the presentation of learning tasks in a blocked 
schedule, which provides a condition of low contextual interference, where only one task 
variation needs to be practiced before moving on to the next (Simon & Bjork, 2001).  
However, in order to be effective in combination with different practice schedules, timing of 
the critical thinking prompts seems crucial. In a blocked practice schedule, critical thinking 
processes would need to be prompted before execution of the task (i.e., proactive), so that 
critical thinking can occur concurrently with task execution. When prompted after task 
execution in a blocked practice schedule, learners may not be inclined to critically reflect, 
since they are under the impression that they already understand the task. In a random 
practice schedule, the key factor in successful planning of critical thinking prompts is the 
learners’ limited processing capacity: When learners already experience high processing 
demands, they will not be able to critically reflect upon their task strategies concurrently 
with task execution. Because in a random practice schedule learners would not be 
hampered by the illusion of competence, prompting critical thinking after execution of the 
learning task (i.e., retrospective) could have beneficial effects on learning without leading to 
processing capacity problems.  
The Present Study 
The present study examines the effects of practice schedule (random or blocked) and 
critical thinking prompts (none, proactive, or retrospective) on judgment performance 
during learning and on a far transfer test, using an MFL-task in the domain of criminal 
investigation. Participants’ read a case description and judge its priority for the police on the 
basis of several cues present in each case description. Both participants’ performance, that 
is, judgment accuracy, and the degree of certainty about the accuracy of their judgments is 
measured, the latter is expected to be an indicator of illusion of competence.   
It is hypothesized that a blocked practice schedule generates better performance and less 
uncertainty during the learning phase than a random practice schedule. When a blocked 
practice schedule is combined with proactive critical thinking prompts, however, uncertainty 
is expected to be at the same level as in a random schedule. Regarding learning outcomes, 
measured in terms of transfer test performance, it is hypothesized that learners in a blocked 
practice schedule profit more from proactive prompts than from retrospective or no 
prompts, while in a random practice schedule, learners benefit more from retrospective 
prompts than from proactive or no prompts.  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 120 students from Dutch universities. Their age varied from 20 to 25 
years (M = 21.58, SD = 1.59). Participation was voluntary and was rewarded with 45 Euros. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions in a 2 x 3 factorial design 
with the factors Practice Schedule (Blocked or Random) and Critical Thinking Prompts 
(Proactive, Retrospective, or None): (1) blocked practice schedule with proactive critical 
thinking prompts (n = 20), (2) blocked practice schedule with retrospective critical thinking 
prompts (n = 20), (3) blocked practice schedule without prompts (n = 19), (4) random 
practice schedule with proactive critical thinking prompts (n = 20), (5) random practice 
schedule with retrospective critical thinking prompts (n = 21), and (6) random practice 
schedule without prompts (n = 20).  
Materials  
Learning tasks. A set of 32 case descriptions of crimes was developed for this experiment. 
Each case had to be prioritized on the urgency for the police to deal with it. Priorities could 
be determined on the basis of the dichotomous values on three different cues that occurred 
in each case description: (1) the condition of the victim (injured, dead), (2) the nature of the 
crime (burglary, violence/holdup), and (3) the use of a weapon (no firearm, firearm). Table 1 
presents the priority scores for each combination of cue values. Four crime descriptions 
were developed for each of the eight combinations of cue values, resulting in 32 cases (see 
Figure 5.1 for an example of a case).  
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Table 5.1 
Schematic Overview of the Cues, Cue Values and Subsequent Priorities 
Learning and near transfer cases (crimes) 
Condition of victim Weapon Nature of crime Priority 
Burglary 62 Firearm 
Violence 91 
Burglary 58 
Dead 
No firearm 
Violence 72 
Burglary 29 Firearm 
Violence 43 
Burglary 10 
Injured 
No firearm 
Violence 39 
Far Transfer cases (traffic offenses) 
Nature of the offense Condition of Offender History Priority 
First offence 84 Drunk 
Recidivist 94 
First offence 64 
Speeding 
Not drunk 
Recidivist 74 
First offence 32 Drunk 
Recidivist 40 
First offence 12 
Driving without 
insurance 
Not drunk 
Recidivist 20 
 
The cases were presented one by one on a computer screen. On the lower half of the 
screen, beneath the presentation of the case, a slide bar with an indicator of priority was 
presented. The slide bar covered the whole range of priority scores: 1-100. There were no 
numbers or other reference points on or near the slide bar. An indicator on the slide bar 
could be manipulated with the computer mouse to mark the priority of a case. In addition, 
the margin of the area on the right and the left from the indicator could be adjusted 
(minimum = 2, maximum = 50) to indicate certainty about the accuracy of the response.  
Feedback during the learning session consisted of a second slide bar with the indicator at 
the position of the true priority score. This feedback slide bar was presented above the first 
one, directly after participants indicated their priority and certainty score. If the true priority 
score was within the certainty margin of the participant’s response, a green rectangle was 
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presented around the feedback slide bar. If the true priority score lay outside this certainty 
margin, a red rectangle was presented around the feedback slide bar. 
 
Figure 5.1: Example of the task for participants, as it was presented on the computer screen 
(translated, original in Dutch). 
Practice schedules. In the blocked practice schedule, the order of the 32 learning tasks was 
the same for all participants. The 32 cases were sequenced in such a way that in the first 
block of 12 cases only one cue changed its value from one case to the next, and the cue that 
changed its value was alternated from case to case. Thus, if the first case involved a dead 
victim (cue 1) after a burglary (cue 2) and the use of a firearm (cue 3), the second case 
could be a dead victim (cue 1: unchanged) after a burglary(cue 2: unchanged) without the use 
of a firearm (cue 3: changed), and the third case could subsequently be an injured victim (cue 
1: changed) after a burglary (cue 2: unchanged) without the use of a firearm (cue 3: 
unchanged). In the second block of 12 cases two cues simultaneously changed value from 
one case to the next. In the last block of 8 cases all three cues changed value from one case 
to the next. In the random practice schedule the learning tasks were presented in a 
randomized order that was the same for all participants in this schedule. 
Critical thinking instruction and prompts. Participants in all critical thinking conditions were 
introduced to critical thinking with a paper-based instruction explaining four steps: (1) 
creating a model of the relationships between the cues and the priorities, (2) testing a 
model, (3) evaluating a model, and (4) finding alternative explanations (i.e., contingencies). 
Apart from this textual explanation, a hand-out with a graphic representation of the four 
steps (Figure 2) and two short stories of critical thinking in real-world situations were 
provided.  
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Both the 12 proactive and the 12 retrospective prompts were formulated as open-ended 
questions provided on the computer screen, which intended to focus the participant’s 
attention to particular cues and how their priority changed (for examples, see Table 5.2). 
The proactive prompts preceded every two or three cases, similar retrospective prompts 
followed those same cases, thus, only the timing relative to the learning tasks was different 
for both critical thinking conditions. Participants were told that the open ended questions 
could help them learn the task and that they should therefore answer the questions for 
themselves. 
Table 5.2 
Critical Thinking Prompts  
Proactive prompts Reflective prompts 
Are there any similarities between the following 
two cases? Which are they? And what is 
different between these cases? 
Were there any similarities between the last two 
cases? Which were they? And what were the 
differences?  
The following two cases will differ from the 
former two cases on one specific aspect. Can 
you tell me what that is? And does it have an 
effect on the priority of a case?  
The last two cases were different from the two 
preceding cases on one specific aspect. Can you 
tell me what that was? And did it have an effect 
on the priority of a case? 
Do you consider some aspects to be more 
important than others when estimating a case’s 
priority? 
Do you consider some aspects to be more 
important than others when estimating a case’s 
priority?  
 
Near and far transfer tests. The near transfer test consisted of 8 cases that were similar to 
the learning tasks in structural features (same combination of cues and same domain, i.e., 
crimes) but different to the learning tasks in surface features (i.e., cover stories). The near 
transfer cases were presented in the same random order to all participants and the 
sequence contained no critical thinking prompts and no feedback. 
The far transfer test consisted of 32 cases describing traffic offenses that differed in both 
structural and surface features from the learning tasks. Priorities depended on: (1) nature of 
the offence (speeding, driving without insurance), (2) condition of the offender (drunk, not 
drunk), and (3) history (first offence, recidivist). These far transfer cases were scheduled in 
random order that was the same for all participants and no critical thinking prompts were 
given. However, feedback was provided because this new domain contained new cues to 
base the priority on. See Table 5.1 for an overview of the cues and priorities of the learning, 
near transfer, and far transfer cases. 
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Procedure  
The experiment had a duration of approximately two hours and was run in sessions with at 
most six participants. Before the experiment started, participants read a short instruction 
explaining how to rate the priority of the cases by means of the slide bar and how to 
indicate the margin of certainty. All participants received paper and pencil to make notes. In 
addition, the critical thinking conditions received a written instruction about the four steps 
of the critical thinking method, the hand-out with the graphical representation of the four 
steps of critical thinking (cf. Figure 5.2), and two example stories of critical thinking in real 
world situations. Then, all participants were assigned to a computer and started to work on 
the learning tasks of their respective condition. The near transfer test was administered 
right after completion of the learning tasks, and the far transfer test immediately followed 
the near transfer test. 
Participants could choose their own pace; the time they took to complete the whole 
experiment was logged. For both learning tasks and transfer test cases, participants’ deviation 
score, defined as the absolute difference between the estimated priority and the true priority 
of the case, and the uncertainty margin they indicated were automatically stored in a logfile. 
After completion of the far transfer test open exit interviews were conducted with the 
participants. 
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Figure 5.2: Schematic overview of the critical thinking steps (translated, original in Dutch). 
Results 
The mean deviation scores and mean uncertainty margins were calculated for each 
participant. See Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 for those data from the learning phase, near transfer 
test, and far transfer test, respectively. Time-on-task did not differ between conditions, F(1, 
114) = .01, p > .20. In all analyses reported below, a significance level of .05 is set, and partial 
eta-squared is reported as a measure of effect size.  
Learning Phase 
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores and the 
uncertainty margins in the learning phase for all conditions. A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the mean 
deviation scores showed that practice schedule had a significant effect in the learning phase, 
F(1,114) = 14.43, MSE = 191.21, p < .01, !p2 = .11 In line with our hypothesis, participants 
who worked in a blocked practice schedule performed better (lower deviation scores) 
Input 
Case descriptions 
Priorities of preceding cases 
1. Model Building
Which cues are relevant? 
How are they correlated? 
How do the cues relate to the priority? 
2. Model Testing 
Do I have all necessary information? 
Is there a conflict in the evidence? 
Do I need to make assumptions? 
Do I need to change my story? 
4. Define your model
Which cues? 
How are they correlated? 
How do they influence the priority? 
Do you have an alternative? 3. Evaluation 
The Devil’s Advocate tells you that your model 
 is wrong: the cues you think are important  
are not relevant. Make up an alternative model, 
i.e. identify another set of possible cues, or try if 
different relationships between cues ad priority 
are plausible. 
Is the alternative more plausible than the original? 
Output
Priority judgment  
based on your model 
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during the learning phase than participants in the random practice schedule. There was no 
significant effect of critical thinking prompts, F(2, 114) = 2.23, ns, but there was a trend 
towards an interaction effect between critical thinking prompts and practice schedule, F(2, 
114) = 2.64, MSE = 35.02, p = .08, !p2=.04. Separate analyses within practice schedules 
showed no significant effect of critical thinking prompts on the deviation scores in the 
blocked practice schedule, F(2, 56) = .05, ns, but a significant effect of critical thinking 
prompts in the random practice schedule, F(2, 58) = 4.34, MSE = 65.30, p = .02, !p2 = .13, 
with post hoc Tukey tests indicating that retrospective critical thinking prompts yielded 
lower deviation scores than both proactive critical thinking prompts (|Mdiff | = 2.94, p = .05) 
and no critical thinking prompts (|Mdiff | = 3.20, p = .03). 
Table 5.3 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Deviation Scores and Uncertainty Margins for All 
Conditions in the Learning Phase 
 
Blocked practice schedule  Random practice schedule 
Retrospective 
prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No 
Prompts 
 Retrospectiv
e prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No 
prompts 
 
M SD M SD M SD  M SD M SD M SD 
Deviation 18.43 2.81 18.48 3.59 18.16 3.67  18.83 5.41 21.78 2.79 22.04 2.70 
Uncertainty 13.32 4.83 8.79 1.48 13.28 4.96  12.71 3.00 13.15 2.96 10.48 2.76 
 
Analyses of the uncertainty margins showed that practice schedule had no effect on the 
uncertainty margins, F(1, 114) = 0.24, ns. Critical thinking prompts significantly affected 
participants’ uncertainty margins, F(2, 114) = 3.43, MSE = 42.75, p = .04, !p2 = .06, and there 
was a significant interaction between critical thinking prompts and practice schedule, F(2, 
114) = 10.75, MSE = 133.84, p < .01, !p2=.16. Therefore, the effects of critical thinking 
prompts were analyzed separately for both practice schedules. In a blocked practice 
schedule, critical thinking prompts had a significant effect on the uncertainty margins, F(2, 
56) = 8.14, MSE = 134.83, p = .01, !p2 = .23, with proactive critical thinking prompts leading 
to smaller uncertainty margins than both retrospective critical thinking prompts (|Mdiff | = 
4.54, p < 0.01) and no critical thinking prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.50, p < .01). In a random practice 
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schedule, critical thinking prompts also significantly affected the uncertainty margins, F(2, 58) 
= 4.89, MSE = 41.43, p = 0.01, !p2 = .14: Participants who received no critical thinking 
prompts had smaller uncertainty margins than participants who received either 
retrospective critical thinking prompts ( |Mdiff | = 2.24, p = .04) or proactive critical thinking 
prompts (|Mdiff | = 2.68, p = .01). 
Near Transfer Test 
Table 5.4 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores and 
uncertainty margins on the near transfer test. A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the mean deviation 
scores showed that critical thinking prompts had no main effect on performance on the near 
transfer test, F(2, 114) = 2.59, ns. There was a main effect of practice schedule, F(1, 114) = 
4.23, MSE = 120.39, p = .04, !p2  = .04: Participants in the random practice schedule reached 
lower deviation scores on the near transfer test (i.e., better performance) than participants 
in the blocked practice schedule (|Mdiff | = 2.01, p = .04). However, there was also a 
significant interaction between practice schedule and critical thinking prompts, F(2, 114) = 
3.26, MSE = 92.78, p = .04, !p2 = .05. Analysis of the practice schedules separately showed a 
significant effect of critical thinking prompts in the random schedule, F(2, 58) = 5.98, MSE = 
153.70, p < .01, !p2 = .17, with retrospective prompts yielding significantly better results than 
both proactive prompts (|Mdiff | = 5.23, p < .01) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 3.964, p = .05). In 
the blocked practice schedule, critical thinking prompts had no effect on the deviation 
scores of the near transfer test, F(2, 56) = .48, ns.   
Analysis of the uncertainty margins showed a main effect of practice schedule, F(1, 114) = 
4.58, MSE = 63.83, p = .03, !p2 = .04, indicating that participants in the random practice 
schedule had smaller uncertainty margins on the near transfer test than participants in the 
blocked practice schedule (|Mdiff | = 1.53, p = .03). There was also a main effect of critical 
thinking prompts on uncertainty margins, F(2, 114) = 4.19, MSE = 69.75, p = .02, !p2 = .07. 
Tukey post hoc tests showed significantly higher uncertainty margins in the condition 
without critical thinking prompts than in the condition with proactive critical thinking 
prompts (|Mdiff | = 2.414, p = .02). However, the significant interaction between practice 
schedule and critical thinking prompts, F(2, 114) = 3.94, MSE = 59.89, p = .02, !p2 = .07, 
indicated that critical thinking prompts had a differential effect in the random and blocked 
practice schedule. In the random practice schedule, critical thinking prompts had no effect 
on the uncertainty margins, F(2, 58) = .81, ns. In the blocked practice schedule, critical 
thinking prompts did have a significant effect, F(2, 56) = 6.15, MSE = 113.17, p < .01, !p2 = 
.18, with post hoc Tukey tests indicating that proactive prompts yielded smaller uncertainty 
margins than both retrospective prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.20, p = .01) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 
4.07, p = .01).  
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Table 5.4 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Deviation Scores and Uncertainty Margins for All 
Conditions on the Near Transfer Test 
Blocked practice schedule Random practice schedule 
Retrospective 
prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No 
Prompts 
Retrospective 
prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No 
prompts 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Deviation 16.00 5.06 15.18 5.79 16.94 5.91 10.97 5.81 16.21 4.45 14.94 4.81 
Uncertainty 13.26 4.70 9.06 2.80 13.13 5.07 9.64 3.71 10.21 3.36 11.03 3.55 
 
Far Transfer Test 
Table 5.5 presents the means and standard deviations of the deviation scores and 
uncertainty margins on the far transfer test. A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the mean deviation scores 
showed a main effect of practice schedule on the far transfer test, F(1, 114) = 38.21, MSE = 
977.51, p < .01, !p2 = .25. Participants in the random practice schedule performed better 
(i.e., lower deviation scores) than participants in the blocked practice schedule. Critical 
thinking prompts had no main effect, F(2, 114) = 1.84, ns, however, there was a significant 
interaction between practice schedule and critical thinking prompts, F(2, 114) = 8.97, MSE = 
229.57,  p < .01, !p2 = .14. Further investigation of this interaction by analyzing random and 
blocked practice schedules separately, showed that critical thinking prompts significantly 
affected participants’ far transfer score, both after a random practice schedule, F(2, 58) = 
4.13, MSE = 116.73, p = .02, !p2 = .12, and a blocked practice schedule, F(2, 56) = 6.94, MSE 
= 158.18, p < 0.01, !p2 = .20. In line with our hypothesis, in a random practice schedule, 
retrospective critical thinking prompts yielded better scores on the far transfer test than 
both proactive prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.14, p = .04) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.19, p = .04), 
whereas in a blocked practice schedule, proactive prompts lead to better scores than both 
retrospective prompts (|Mdiff | = 5.36, p < .01) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.18, p = .02).  
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Table 5.5 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Deviation Scores and Uncertainty Margins for All 
Conditions on the Far Transfer Test 
Blocked practice schedule Random practice schedule 
Retrospectiv
e prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No prompts Retrospective 
prompts 
Proactive 
prompts 
No prompts 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Deviation 23.16 5.48 17.80 3.03 21.98 5.44 12.49 4.95 16.63 5.66 16.68 5.29 
Uncertainty 11.33 4.29 7.94 1.32 12.06 4.40 7.44 2.72 7.49 2.80 8.00 2.65 
 
Analyses of the uncertainty margins showed a main effect of practice schedule, F(1, 114) = 
22.97, MSE = 234.47, p < .01, !p2 = .17, indicating that participants in the random practice 
schedule had lower uncertainty margins than participants in the blocked practice schedule 
(|Mdiff | = 2.80, p < .01). There was also a main effect of critical thinking prompts on the 
uncertainty margins, F(2, 114) = 5.63, MSE = 57.48, p < .01, !p2 = .90. Tukey post hoc tests 
showed that proactive prompts yielded significantly lower uncertainty margins than both 
retrospective prompts (|Mdiff | = 2.27, p < .01) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 0.17, p = .05). The 
interaction between practice schedule and critical thinking prompts, F(2, 114) = 4.12, MSE = 
42.07, p = .02, !p2 = .07, was significant, therefore, the effects of critical thinking prompts on 
the uncertainty margins were analyzed separately for the random and blocked practice 
schedules. In a random practice schedule, critical thinking prompts did not affect the 
uncertainty margins on the far transfer test, F(2, 58) = .261, ns. However, in  a blocked 
practice schedule, critical thinking prompts significantly affected the uncertainty margins on 
the far transfer test, F(2, 56) = 7.31, MSE = 95.48, p < .01, !p2 = .21, with post hoc Tukey 
tests indicating that proactive prompts resulted in smaller uncertainty margins than both 
retrospective prompts  (|Mdiff | = 3.39, p = .01) and no prompts (|Mdiff | = 4.13, p < 0.01).  
Discussion 
This study examined the effects of proactive and retrospective critical thinking prompts 
provided in combination with random and blocked practice schedules on learning a 
multidimensional functional learning task. With respect to participants’ performance and 
uncertainty about the accuracy of their judgments, it was hypothesized that: (1) A blocked 
practice schedule yields better performance and less uncertainty during the learning phase 
than a random practice schedule, (2) a blocked practice schedule combined with proactive 
critical thinking prompts shows the same level of uncertainty as a random schedule without 
prompts, and (3) a blocked practice schedule yields higher transfer when participants 
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receive proactive critical thinking prompts rather than retrospective or no prompts, but a 
random practice schedule yields higher transfer when participants receive retrospective 
prompts rather than proactive or no prompts.  
In line with our first hypothesis, results showed that in the learning phase, participants who 
followed a blocked practice schedule performed better than participants who practiced 
according to a random schedule. This is consistent with research findings on the effects of 
contextual interference on the acquisition of motor skills (Brady, 1998; Magill & Hall, 1990), 
troubleshooting skills (De Croock et al., 1998; Jelsma, Van Merriënboer, & Bijlstra, 1990), 
and language skills (Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 2002). However, contrary to our 
expectation, practice schedule did not affect the reported uncertainty margins, and even led 
to opposite results in the blocked practice schedule with proactive prompts: Uncertainty 
margins were significantly lower than in the retrospective or no prompts conditions, while 
we hypothesized that the proactive prompts would prevent participants in the blocked 
group to develop an illusion of competence, which would increase uncertainty about their 
judgments. There are several explanations for this unexpected finding. First, it might be the 
case that illusions of competence did not occur and that the explanations for the contextual 
interference effect should indeed be sought in the beneficial effects of random practice 
rather than the detrimental effects of blocked practice. Second, uncertainty margins might 
not be an adequate measure of illusions of competence.  
Looking at near transfer test performance, we see that participants who followed a random 
practice schedule benefited most from retrospective prompts as we hypothesized. 
However, the results of participants who followed a blocked practice schedule are not in 
line with our hypothesis: Their near transfer test performance was not affected by critical 
thinking prompts. The explanation for this finding probably lies in the nature of the near 
transfer tasks. Because these tasks did not differ from the learning tasks on structural 
features, participants in all blocked conditions could rely on their specific memories of 
similar cases from the learning phase. That is, the near transfer tasks do not measure the 
effects of practice schedule on deep understanding. If this explanation is correct, the 
beneficial effects of proactive prompts with blocked practice should show up on far transfer 
test performance.  
And indeed, in line with our hypothesis, the results on the far transfer test showed superior 
performance when a random schedule was combined with retrospective critical thinking 
prompts, and when a blocked schedule was combined with proactive prompts. In the latter 
condition, transfer test performance was even comparable to that of participants who 
followed a random practice schedule without critical thinking prompts. This finding has two 
interesting implications: (a) Combining both techniques to increase interference has surplus 
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value, provided that the prompts are appropriately timed, and (b) critical thinking is an 
instructional technique that probably also increases interference and that can be just as 
effective as providing a random practice schedule, again, provided that the prompts are 
appropriately timed. However, when prompts are not appropriately timed participants’ 
performance need not be negatively affected, as the results of the random condition showed 
us: Adding proactive prompts did not deteriorate transfer test performance when compared 
to the no prompts condition. 
The second implication, suggesting that critical thinking may replace a random practice 
schedule, is especially interesting if one considers that there seem to be situations in which 
tasks are so complex that a random practice schedule starts to hamper learning and blocked 
practice is the preferred option (cf. Wulf & Shea, 2002). Future research should establish 
whether under such very high complexity conditions, critical thinking prompts could still be 
successfully implemented to enhance transfer of learning.  
The findings of this study are highly relevant for training settings, and are relatively easy to 
implement. However, in considering the practical implications of our results, we have to 
take into account our operationalization of a blocked practice schedule, which is due to the 
complexity of our task somewhat different from blocked schedules as they are traditionally 
designed in contextual interference studies. In a traditional blocked schedule, the sequence 
of learning tasks is such that only one task variation per block is practiced (e.g. block 1: 
AAAAAA, block 2: BBBBB, where A and B are variations of the learning task). As we stated 
in the Introduction, in complex judgment, the task for the judge is to predict a future 
outcome on the basis of a few cues. In learning to predict such future outcomes, the judge 
has to learn which cues are relevant (cue selection), how each cue relates to the criterion 
to be predicted, and whether cues are intercorrelated (i.e., cue-criterion functions). Thus, 
the creation of blocks for these complex judgment tasks is less straightforward than it 
would be for less complex tasks. The blocked schedules in our experiments were such that 
in the first blocks one cue changed value from one task to the next. In terms of predicting 
the future outcomes, this would not seem to be a blocked sequence as the resulting 
sequential tasks are different task variations. However, in terms of the learning task, that is, 
to learn cue-criterion functions, participants are provided the opportunity to learn the 
effects of one cue-criterion function before moving on to learning the next. And in the last 
blocks, two (or more) cues changed value from one case to the next, providing the 
opportunity to learn the interaction between the cues. As such, this is a blocked practice 
schedule, and moreover, one that resembles real world training approaches for complex 
judgment and decision making. For example, sonar image operators, in their training to 
identify and judge sonar contacts, first learn how a sonar image depends on ocean bottom 
patterns, then how water temperatures influence sonar image, and only after that, how 
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ocean bottom pattern and water temperatures interact and how that influences the sonar 
image (see e.g., www.mosaichydro.com). The data presented here, however, clearly show 
that such training programs better present the trainee with a random sequence of cases, 
best combined with retrospective prompts, and leaving it to the trainee to identify and 
categorize cues and cue-criterion relationships. 
Unfortunately, despite the large body of research showing beneficial effects of random 
practice, instruction is more often than not still structured in such a way that task variety A 
has to be mastered before moving on to task variety B. However, studies such as this one 
show that both students and their teachers may think that a task is sufficiently mastered in 
such a blocked schedule when this is not actually true, because performance during the 
learning phase is a poor indicator of actual learning outcomes and, especially, of far transfer. 
The present study shows, nonetheless, that the intuitively appealing blocked practice format 
does not have to be discarded completely: By combining it with proactive prompts effects 
on learning are enhanced. This is also good news for instructors using training technologies 
such as commercially available PC games, of which the event sequences cannot always be 
adapted. Utilizing techniques such as proactive  critical thinking in blocked practice 
schedules, may improve the educational value of such games.  
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Abstract 
This chapter discusses the findings of the empirical studies reported in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5 in terms of theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and 
suggestions for further research. It can be concluded that the experiments 
reported in Chapters 3 and 5 prove that critical thinking instruction significantly 
benefits learning complex judgment tasks, although it has not yet been established 
whether the entire critical thinking instruction or specific processes evoked at 
certain moments, such as reflection and self explanation, were responsible for the 
learning and transfer benefit. Similarly, in Chapters 4 and 5 a benefit of contextual 
interference for learning complex judgment was reported. In Chapter 4, this 
benefit arose without detrimental effects on performance during learning, 
whereas in Chapter 5 detrimental effects during the learning phase were 
observed of a random (high contextual interference) compared to a blocked 
schedule. The collected data cannot fully explain this incongruence. Despite these 
limitations, it is suggested that critical thinking can be fruitfully implemented in 
current and future training programs for complex judgment and decision making. 
With a correct timing of critical thinking prompts, the effectiveness not only of 
random but also of blocked practice schedules can be greatly enhanced. 
Professional decision makers have to operate more and more in complex and highly 
interactive, quickly changing environments. Their decisions may affect the lives of many, and 
therefore, it is paramount that they are adequately prepared for their tasks. Experience is 
important, but given the far-reaching consequences of suboptimal decisions, relying solely on 
experience is dangerous. Prior or additional (on-the-job) training is necessary. Therefore, 
the main question this dissertation tried to answer is how acquisition of complex judgment 
and decision making skills can best be fostered.   
Complex judgment and decision making is a highly demanding task. It involves collecting and 
integrating information from different sources (cues) to predict a future outcome. Studies 
on decision making have provided knowledge of how experienced decision makers approach 
such complex decision problems (Anderson, 1993; Klein, 1998). It seems to involve at least 
two types of skill: (1) recognition skills based on subject matter expertise (i.e., acquired 
cognitive schemas), that is, knowledge of relevant cues, their mutual interrelationships and 
the relationships with  the criterion value that needs to be predicted, and (2) higher order 
critical thinking skills that serve to increase understanding by means of generalization and 
abstraction. Targeting training at these skills may improve learning and transfer of subject 
matter expertise through elaboration of the content (e.g., by generalisation, discrimination, 
or abstracting away from it). The main aim of this dissertation was to study whether 
instructional methods for implementing critical thinking (Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996) 
and contextual interference (Battig, 1972, 1979; Lee & Magill, 1983; Magill & Hall, 1990; 
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Shapiro & Schmidt, 1982; Shea & Morgan, 1979), separately and in combination, can increase 
transfer of judgment skills to new tasks and contexts. Recapitulating, the research questions 
were: 
1. Does critical thinking instruction improve learning of a complex judgment and 
decision making task?  
2. Does the contextual interference effect manifest itself in learning a complex 
judgment task? 
3. What are the combined effects of contextual interference and critical thinking 
prompts on acquisition and transfer test performance of a complex judgment task?  
In the following, first a discussion of the main findings is presented, encompassing a 
discussion on critical thinking instruction, the effects of contextual interference, the 
combined effects of critical thinking and contextual interference and a summary. Then, the 
limitations, theoretical implications and questions for future research are discussed. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with summarizing the practical implications.  
Discussion of Main Findings 
Critical Thinking Instruction 
An evaluation of the literature showed that positive effects of critical thinking instruction on 
learning, retention and transfer of complex judgment and decision making have not been 
established in controlled experimental studies. This may be a consequence of the fact that 
critical thinking instruction largely stems from naturalistic decision making (NDM) research. 
As described in Chapter 2, this research approach to decision making focuses on studying 
behavior of experienced decision makers in natural environments (e.g., at the workplace). 
The NDM approach provided several descriptive models of decision making, such as the 
Recognition-Metacognition model (Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 
1996), which placed recognition at the heart of decision making. Therefore, a prerequisite 
for critical thinking instruction resulting from this model of decision making is that learners 
must already have, or be able to simultaneously acquire, basic knowledge of the domain in 
which they are taught the critical thinking skills.  
With respect to implementation of critical thinking instruction, it is required that the skills 
are taught as part of learning a specific task or a specific piece of knowledge. Indeed, despite 
the ongoing debate on the generalizability of certain types of cognitive skills, the evidence 
that (critical) thinking skills can be taught separately from any application in a specific domain 
is meager (Gagné, 1984). Although experienced decision makers seem to have specific 
critical thinking skills that enable them to operate in a multitude of situations, these skills 
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were not trained or acquired independent from a domain (see, e.g., Ten Dam & Volman, 
2002; Tsui, 1999). What seems more plausible is that task specific knowledge and strategies 
are acquired and then tried across different tasks and domains to arrive, after many years of 
experience, at a level of general and abstract critical thinking skills (Ten Dam & Volman, 
2002; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). In this dissertation, the question was studied whether it is 
feasible to deliberately teach these expert skills, embedded in domain specific tasks, to 
relative novices. Some researchers questioned the viability of such an approach, claiming 
that novices in a particular domain may experience too high a workload from understanding 
the rules and principles of the domain and therefore do not have the cognitive resources 
available for (learning) higher order thinking skills (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Winne, 
1995). This high workload may be especially problematic, as research inspired by cognitive 
load theory (Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998; Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005) has 
shown that adding additional instructions under high workload conditions (i.e., in which 
learners have little if any cognitive resources available) may not just be ineffective but 
actually hamper learning in the domain (for a review see, e.g., Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & 
Sweller, 2003). 
Whereas one may question the value of critical thinking instruction for novice learners on 
the basis of cognitive load considerations, both the field studies (Chapter 3) and the 
laboratory experiment (Chapter 5) presented in this dissertation showed that critical 
thinking instruction enhances retention and, in particular, transfer test performance. In the 
field studies, critical thinking instruction was embedded in professional training in command 
and control judgment and decision making for relative novices in the domain with only a few 
years of experience. In the laboratory experiment the participants were genuine novices 
(i.e., they had no prior experience whatsoever with the learning task), but they were still 
able to profit from the critical thinking instruction and reflection prompts while learning a 
complex judgment task, provided the prompts were appropriately timed in their particular 
practice schedule: Pro-active in a blocked schedule and retrospective in a random schedule 
(see Chapter 5). This is an interesting outcome in the light of Winne’s (1995) discussion of 
experiencing a high workload and not having the resources available for higher order 
thinking skills. When critical thinking prompts were not appropriately timed, participants’ 
performance indeed did not benefit from critical thinking instruction, possibly indicating they 
were not able to use the prompts due to high workload. But their performance was not 
negatively affected, which suggests that in high workload conditions learners may be able to 
ignore given prompts all together and focus on learning the specific rules and principles of 
the task without being distracted by them.  
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Contextual Interference 
In Chapter 2, based on the literature several explanations were described for the benefit of 
random practice schedules (i.e., high contextual interference) compared to blocked practice 
schedules (i.e., low contextual interference). This benefit has been found for retention and 
transfer across tasks relying on many types of skill and knowledge (e.g., Brady, 1998; Wulf & 
Shea, 2002). Different explanations for the positive effects of random practice (e.g., Lee & 
Magill, 1983; Shea & Morgan, 1979; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992) have in common that they 
assume that a random practice schedule calls for more elaborative processing between or 
within tasks, and that these elaborative processes lead to deeper understanding and, 
consequently, better retention and transfer test performance.  
The results of our laboratory studies on contextual interference (Chapter 4) demonstrated 
the hypothesized benefits of random practice schedules on retention and transfer of 
complex judgment tasks, without showing the performance detriment during the learning 
phase often reported as a result of random practice. This result was fully in line with findings 
of Immink and Wright (1998). With regard to performance detriments during learning, they 
found that the time between the randomly scheduled learning tasks is crucial: The decline 
does not occur when enough time is provided. They assumed this was the case because 
learners need to replan their actions between randomly sequenced tasks and need time to 
do so. In their study, replanning involved reconstruction of an action plan for the next 
movement in pressing a sequence of keys on a keyboard. In the studies reported in Chapter 
4, the start of each learning task was self paced, possibly giving participants sufficient time to 
replan their response in a random schedule. Whereas Immink and Wright provide a likely 
explanation, it should be noted though that their study involved a very different task. It still 
needs to be ascertained whether a similar mechanism applies to the acquisition of the 
complex cognitive task of judgment and decision-making used in our study, especially 
because a detrimental effect of random compared to blocked practice during the learning 
phase was found in the experiment reported in Chapter 5 (see below).  
In Chapter 5 another explanation for the differential effects of random and blocked practice 
schedules on retention and transfer was given, focusing less on the benefits of random 
practice and more on the potential drawbacks of blocked practice. This potential 
explanation concerns an illusion of competence learners may experience as a result of the 
repetitive presentation of the same type of task in a blocked practice schedule (Koriat & 
Bjork, 2005). Illusions of competence may inhibit search and application of alternative task 
strategies and thus deteriorate gaining a deeper level of understanding (Kornell & Bjork, 
2007). As a consequence, transfer and, in particular, far transfer test performance might be 
hampered in a blocked sequence compared to a random sequence, where illusions of 
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competence are less likely to occur because learners are confronted with constantly varying 
learning tasks.  
The experiment reported in Chapter 5 showed similar benefits of random practice for near 
and far transfer performance.  As mentioned previously, with regard to performance during 
the learning phase, the results from the last experiment (Chapter 5) were not consistent 
with those of the previous experiments (Chapter 4). In the final experiment, participants’ 
performance during the learning phase was better in a blocked practice schedule than in a 
random practice schedule, even though they were again allowed to control their own pace, 
as in the earlier experiments. The incongruence may be due to a difference in the judgment 
tasks between the experiments of Chapters 4 and 5: In the experiment in Chapter 5, 
participants were required to identify the relevant cues in each case description by 
themselves, whereas in the former experiments those relevant cues were given to them. 
Thus, in the former experiments the task was to integrate information from the cues and to 
predict a future outcome, while in the final experiment this task was expanded with the 
identification of relevant cues. Cue identification may have been far more difficult in a 
random schedule than in a blocked schedule, since in a blocked schedule only one cue 
changed value from one case to the next, making it relatively easy to spot that cue. In a 
random schedule, cues and values changed randomly, making it much harder to identify the 
relevant cues. However, whether this difference in the complex judgment task has indeed 
caused the different results for the learning phase performance between the experiments of 
Chapter 4 and 5 remains uncertain. This is an interesting question for future research, as it 
might imply that Immink and Wright’s (1998) finding that availability of time between 
learning tasks is the crucial factor, may actually depend on the type of task.     
Combining critical thinking instruction and contextual interference 
In the experiment of Chapter 5, critical thinking instruction was combined with random and 
blocked practice schedules to investigate it’s combined effects on learning complex 
judgment. To deal with learners’ limited processing capacity and illusions of competence, it 
was hypothesized that the timing of critical thinking prompts is crucial in order to be 
effective. In a blocked schedule, critical thinking processes would need to be prompted 
before execution of the task (i.e., proactive), so that critical thinking may occur concurrently 
with performing the learning task. When prompted after task execution in a blocked 
practice schedule, learners are not expected to critically reflect, since they are under the 
impression that they already understand the task (illusion of competence). In a random 
practice schedule, the key factor for successfully planning critical thinking prompts would be 
the learners’ limited processing capacity: When learners already experience high processing 
demands, they will not be able to critically reflect on their task strategies concurrently with 
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performing the learning task. Therefore, it was expected that prompting critical thinking 
after execution of the learning task (i.e., retrospective) would have beneficial effects on 
learning without leading to processing capacity problems.  
In line with our hypotheses, it was found that proactive prompting in a blocked schedule 
benefited learning, as did retrospective prompting in a random schedule. A blocked practice 
schedule with proactive critical thinking prompts even brought far transfer test performance 
at a similar level as a random practice schedule without critical thinking instruction. These 
results suggest that under conditions where blocked practice is the only viable option (e.g., 
because the learning tasks are too complex, so that providing learners with a random 
schedule would increase workload to an unacceptable level), presenting proactive critical 
thinking prompts might provide enough interference to enhance transfer. However, future 
research should establish if under very high task complexity conditions, critical thinking 
prompts might still be successfully implemented to enhance transfer test performance.  
It is interesting to note that the results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that critical thinking 
instruction has similar effects as random practice, that is, it can raise learners’ performance 
after a blocked schedule to the same level reached in a random schedule without prompts. 
Furthermore, critical thinking instruction can amplify the effects of a random practice 
schedule, that is, random practice combined with retrospective prompts is more effective 
than random practice without prompts. On the one hand, critical thinking instruction may 
lead learners to become engaged in more elaborative processing of particular tasks and 
series of tasks, comparable to the explanation for benefits of random practice schedules. On 
the other hand, critical thinking instruction may also prevent learners from developing an 
illusion of competence, because it forces them to focus on testing hypotheses, critiquing 
arguments, and developing contingency plans. Thus, preventing illusions of competence may 
possibly by reached by random practice as well critical thinking instruction. 
To monitor whether participants developed an illusion of competence during learning, in the 
experiment of Chapter 5, participants’ uncertainty margins were measured as an indication 
of their confidence in the accuracy of their own judgments. It was expected that during the 
learning phase, uncertainty would be lower in a blocked practice schedule, as a result of an 
illusion of competence that learners would develop as a consequence of the repetitive 
presentation of similar learning tasks. However, contrary to the expectation, practice 
schedule did not affect the reported uncertainty margins: Uncertainty was at a similar level 
in random and blocked practice schedules. At the same time, results showed that proactive 
critical thinking prompts decreased uncertainty, indicating that participants were more 
certain of the accuracy of their judgments. This was also opposite to what was 
hypothesized, since proactive critical thinking prompts were expected to provide 
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participants with a more realistic view of their own performance during blocked practice 
and thereby increase uncertainty. Yet, in accordance with our expectation, test performance 
of the blocked group with proactive prompts was better than that of the blocked group that 
received no prompts or retrospective prompts. So, it might still be true that an illusion of 
competence was prevented by proactive prompts. This did, however, not show in the 
uncertainty scores in the way it was expected to, indicating that these scores might not 
represent a good measure of illusions of competence. To find out what learners consider 
when they rate priorities, future research should develop and use alternative measures of 
illusions of competence. In addition, concurrent or retrospective reports (Ericsson & Simon, 
1993) or –under high workload conditions –cued retrospective reports (Van Gog, Paas, Van 
Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005) may help to recognize illusions of competence.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The studies presented in this dissertation established that an approach such as critical 
thinking instruction enhanced learning and transfer in complex judgment – both in the field 
and in the laboratory. However, a limitation of these studies in terms of theoretical 
explanations is that both in the field and in the laboratory the comprehensive critical 
thinking instruction was given. This made it impossible to establish whether it is the 
instruction in its entirety or specific aspects of critical thinking, such as reflection or self-
explanation, which are responsible for the benefits on learning and transfer. Future research 
should compare the entire critical thinking instruction with for example reflection prompts 
or self-explanation prompts only, to study the effects of these aspects separately. 
A second limitation concerns the explanation for the benefits of contextual interference on 
learning complex judgment. Explanations have been suggested that focus on the elaboration 
and extra processing of information, which are necessary under conditions of high 
contextual interference but not under conditions of low contextual interference. However, 
an alternative suggestion was made, namely, that elaboration and extra processing are not 
inherent to conditions of high contextual interference, but may be hampered in low 
contextual interference practice schedules as a result of illusions of competence. The two 
types of explanations are not mutually exclusive, that is, it could be that high contextual 
interference leads to extra elaboration and, at the same time, low contextual interference 
leads to illusions of competence. The results do not support one explanation over the 
other, since (a) it could not be determined whether a random practice schedule required 
more processing and elaboration than a blocked practice schedule, and (b) it could not be 
established whether participants actually developed any illusions of competence in a blocked 
practice schedule. Both aspects are interesting for future research. For that, it is first 
important to determine and integrate an adequate and non-intrusive measure to determine 
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participants’ judgments of learning in order to establish whether they develop an illusion of 
competence (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). Second, time on task and/or measures of cognitive 
effort (cf. Paas, 1992) should be measured for each separate learning task and test task, as 
an indication of additional and elaborative processing.  
A third limitation follows from the differences between the laboratory experiments as was 
discussed earlier: In the three laboratory experiments, the tasks trained in the first two 
experiments (Chapter 4) were slightly different from the task trained in the third 
experiment (Chapter 5). Apart from aggregating information from cues and estimating the 
priority of a case on the basis of that information, in the third experiment participants first 
had to identify relevant cues. This difference in tasks to be learned might have been the 
cause for differential effects on performance during the learning phases. However, future 
research is necessary to establish whether contextual interference has indeed differential 
effects on performance during the learning phase for different types of tasks. A positive 
consequence of the difference between the tasks in Chapter 4 and 5, is that all studies 
indicated that contextual interference is effective for transfer, so this effect held even under 
more complex conditions and in combination with critical thinking (which may further 
increase processing demands). 
Practical Implications 
Despite the limitations of the presented studies and the open questions that remain, the 
results provide important practical implications. First, instruction based on expert judgment 
and decision making strategies, such as critical thinking, increases learners’ understanding of 
the learning tasks and improves their post-training performance. It is therefore advisable to 
make critical thinking instruction an integral part of a training program for professional 
decision makers, embedded as a general approach but with learning tasks that feature 
domain-specific judgment and decision problems. Such an approach could encompass the 
four critical thinking steps described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Second, practice in complex judgment and decision making, for example in the domain of 
military command and control, should be randomly sequenced to realize optimal post 
training performance. Unfortunately, despite the large body of research showing beneficial 
effects of random practice, instruction is more often than not still structured in such a way 
that task A has to be mastered before moving on to task B. Studies such as those presented 
in this dissertation show that both teachers and students working in a blocked schedule may 
easily think that they master a task whereas this is not actually true. Performance during the 
learning phase in a blocked schedule may be high, but this is often a poor indicator of actual 
learning outcomes and, especially, far transfer.  
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Thirdly, when a task is highly complex and a random practice schedule would provide novice 
learners with too high a workload, a blocked practice schedule might be combined with 
proactive critical thinking prompts to enhance learning and post training performance. In 
addition, the finding that the effects of blocked practice can be enhanced by proactive 
prompts is also good news for instructors using training software such as commercially 
available training packages or games, of which the event sequences cannot always be 
adapted. Utilizing techniques such as critical thinking may improve the educational value of 
such packages or games.  
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Many of today’s work environments are dynamic and complex sociotechnical systems in 
which professional decision makers need to exercise judgment on issues that may have far 
reaching consequences. These decision makers should be well prepared for their jobs, and 
adequate education and training in complex decision making and judgment is therefore 
paramount. The aim of such education and training programs often is to establish transfer of 
knowledge and skills from the learning tasks to the professional tasks. However, many 
training programs do not take the results of empirical studies into account regarding 
instructional measures and strategies that may enhance transfer. The studies reported in this 
dissertation were undertaken to determine to what extent novice decision makers can 
benefit from specific instruction in judgment strategies as employed by experienced decision 
makers, and to study how contextual interference in practice schedules affects learning and 
transfer in complex judgment and decision making. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research questions and provides an overview of the dissertation. 
In Chapter 2 the theoretical background of the studies presented in this dissertation is 
elaborated. First, an overview of two different approaches to decision making research is 
provided: Social judgment theory (SJT) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Both SJT 
and NDM research emphasize that learning complex judgment and decision making involves, 
on the one hand, learning what the relevant cues upon which to base a decision are and 
how they are related to each other, and, on the other hand, learning (meta)cognitive 
strategies that guide the learning and decision making processes. Within both research 
approaches the effects of several interventions aimed at learning either cues and their 
interrelations or (meta)cognitive strategies have been investigated. These studies focussed 
mostly on performance during learning and/or on retention, that is, later performance on 
similar tasks. However, empirical evaluations of the effects on transfer, that is, later 
performance on novel tasks were scarce. The chapter continues with a discussion of transfer 
of training and measures that may be effective for enhancing transfer of complex judgment, 
such as critical thinking instruction and contextual interference. 
Critical thinking instruction resulted from studying strategies of experienced decision 
makers and has been proven to enhance complex judgment and decision making skills in 
several field studies, at least with regard to performance during learning and retention. 
Critical thinking presumably leads to elaborative processes, such as reflection and/or self 
explanation of similarities and differences between tasks and task contexts, thereby leading 
to more abstract or generalized knowledge of the learning tasks, facilitating retention and 
transfer. However, critical thinking instruction has not been studied yet in well-controlled 
experiments, and transfer test performance was not specifically assessed in earlier evaluative 
field studies.  
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The second measure that might lead to enhanced retention and transfer test performance in 
complex judgment and decision making is contextual interference. Contextual interference 
is the interference between learning tasks as a result of a practice schedule where different 
variations of the learning tasks are sequenced randomly (high interference) as opposed to 
sequenced in separate blocks (low interference). The effects of contextual interference have 
been studied for performance on many types of tasks, and effects have been measured 
during learning, on retention, on near transfer (i.e., transfer to tasks that differ from the 
learning tasks on superficial aspects but are similar in structural aspects), and on far transfer 
(i.e., transfer to tasks that are different from the learning tasks on both superficial and 
structural aspects). High contextual interference (i.e., random practice) has proven to lead 
to enhanced transfer, especially far transfer, in several domains. Chapter 2 describes an 
overview of studies on contextual interference and some mechanisms that may underlie the 
benefits of random practice, such as elaboration processes that lead to more abstract and 
generalized knowledge of the learning tasks and learners’ higher involvement to become 
engaged in elaboration. This chapter concludes with establishing that several interesting 
research questions result from the above: (a) What are the effects of critical thinking on 
transfer? (b) What are the effects of contextual interference on learning complex judgment 
tasks? and (c) What are the combined effects of critical thinking and contextual interference 
on learning, on near transfer, and on far transfer of a complex judgment task? In order to 
address those questions, the subsequent chapters present five experiments in all – two field 
studies on the effects of critical thinking in Chapter 3; two experimental studies on the 
effects of contextual interference in Chapter 4, and a final experiment on the combination 
of effects of critical thinking instruction and contextual interference in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 3 two field studies are reported that investigated the effects of critical thinking 
instruction on complex judgment and decision making. The first study focused on acquisition 
and transfer performance of air force officers learning to command and control ground-to-
air defense operations; the second study on naval (petty) officers learning to command and 
control air and surface warfare. Participants received a training with scenario-based 
exercises in both simplified (Study 1) and high fidelity (Study 2) learning environments. In 
both studies, half of the participants received instruction in critical thinking. The other half 
received the same exercises, but without critical thinking instruction. After training, test 
scenarios were administered to both groups. The results provided support for the 
hypotheses that critical thinking instruction has a positive effect on transfer test 
performance and that this benefit is greater for far transfer than for near transfer. 
Chapter 4 presents two experiments that investigated the potential benefits of a random 
practice schedule relative to a blocked schedule for retention and transfer test performance 
in a complex judgment task. Participants’ task was to read a description of a fictitious crime 
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and to judge its priority on the basis of several cues present in each case description. In 
Experiment 1, participants’ judgment accuracy on a retention test was higher after a random 
practice schedule when compared to a blocked or operational practice schedule, that is, a 
practice schedule that is modelled according to the real world sequence and frequency of 
events. Experiment 2 demonstrated that judgment performance on a transfer test was also 
better after a random practice schedule than after a blocked practice schedule. Both 
experiments failed to show any detrimental effects of random practice on performance 
during the learning phase, which has often been reported in other studies on contextual 
interference. Our findings show that contextual interference also improves retention and 
transfer of complex judgment skill, and that these benefits may be achieved without 
detrimental effects on performance during practice.   
Chapter 5 contains a study that investigated the combined effects of critical thinking 
instruction in blocked and random practice schedules on learning and transfer of complex 
judgment skills. Similar to Chapter 4, participants’ task was to read a description of a 
fictitious crime and to judge its priority on the basis of several cues present in each case 
description, however, this time, participants had to discover the relevant cues themselves. 
Critical thinking prompts (proactive, retrospective, none) were manipulated: Proactive 
prompts were given before the learning task they referred to, thereby facilitating critical 
thinking concurrently with task execution; retrospective prompts were given after 
execution of the tasks they referred to, facilitating reflection upon those tasks. Furthermore, 
practice schedule (random, blocked) was manipulated again to study whether the different 
critical thinking prompts differentially affected random and blocked practice schedules. 
Results showed that during the learning phase a blocked practice schedule led to better 
performance than random practice, which may possibly be due to the difference in tasks 
compared to Chapter 4: The task was now more complex because learners also had to 
identify the relevant cues. During the transfer test phase a random schedule was superior. 
As expected, an interaction effect was also found: Whereas in a random schedule 
retrospective critical thinking prompts have surplus value over proactive prompts, transfer 
performance following a blocked schedule can better be enhanced through proactive critical 
thinking prompts. 
Chapter 6 presents a General Discussion of these findings in terms of the theoretical and 
practical implications, limitations of the studies, and suggestions for further research that 
result from the work presented in this dissertation. It concludes that the experiments 
reported in Chapters 3 and 5 prove that critical thinking instruction significantly benefits 
learning complex judgment tasks, although it has not yet been established whether the 
entire critical thinking instruction or specific processes evoked at certain moments, such as 
reflection and self explanation, were responsible for the learning and transfer benefit. 
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Similarly, in Chapters 4 and 5 a benefit of contextual interference for learning complex 
judgment was reported. In Chapter 4, this benefit arose without detrimental effects on 
performance during learning, whereas in Chapter 5 detrimental effects during the learning 
phase were observed of a random (high contextual interference) compared to a blocked 
schedule. The collected data cannot fully explain this incongruence. Despite these 
limitations, it is suggested that critical thinking can be fruitfully implemented in current and 
future training programs for complex judgment and decision making. With a correct timing 
of critical thinking prompts, not only random but also blocked practice schedules can greatly 
enhance learning and transfer performance. 
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Veel hedendaagse werkomgevingen zijn zeer dynamische en complexe, sociotechnische 
systemen waarin professionals besluiten moeten nemen met soms verstrekkende gevolgen.  
Deze besluitvormers moeten goed voorbereid zijn op hun taken en daarom is adequate 
opleiding en training in beoordelen en beslissen van groot belang. Het doel van zulke 
opleidings- en trainingsprogramma’s is meestal het bewerkstelligen van transfer van kennis 
en vaardigheden van de leertaken naar de operationele taken. Daarbij worden echter 
regelmatig de bevindingen van empirische studies naar het verbeteren van transfer 
genegeerd. De studies die dit proefschrift rapporteert zijn uitgevoerd om te bepalen of  
onervaren besluitvormers baat kunnen hebben bij specifieke instructie in de 
beoordelingsstrategieën van ervaren besluitvormers (‘kritisch-denken instructie’). Daarnaast 
wordt onderzocht of contextuele interferentie in trainingschema’s het leren en de transfer 
van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden positief beïnvloedt. 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de onderzoeksvragen en biedt een overzicht van het proefschrift. 
De theoretische achtergrond van de studies die in dit proefschrift worden gepresenteerd 
staat in Hoofdstuk 2. Allereerst wordt een overzicht gegeven van twee verschillende 
benaderingen van beslisonderzoek: Social Judgment Theory (SJT) en Naturalistic Decision 
Making (NDM). Beide methoden benadrukken dat het voor complexe besluitvorming van 
belang is te leren wat de relevante factoren in een situatie zijn en hoe deze met elkaar 
samenhangen. Tevens wordt het belang benadrukt van het leren van (meta)cognitieve 
vaardigheden die het leer- en besluitvormingsproces sturen. In beide onderzoeksmethoden 
zijn de effecten van diverse interventies gericht op zowel het leren van factoren en hun 
onderlinge relaties als op het leren van (meta)cognitieve strategieën onderzocht. Deze 
studies richtten zich meestal op de prestatie tijdens het leerproces en op retentie, dat wil 
zeggen, prestatie op dezelfde taken na afloop van de training. Empirische evaluaties van de 
effecten van diverse interventies op transfer, dat wil zeggen, prestatie na de training op 
nieuwe taken, zijn schaars. Een discussie over transfer van training volgt, waarin ook 
maatregelen besproken worden die effectief zouden kunnen zijn voor het bevorderen van 
deze transfer, zoals critical thinking instructie en contextuele interferentie. 
Critical thinking instructie is het resultaat van diverse studies naar de strategie van ervaren 
besluitvormers in hun natuurlijke taakomgeving. Het is een aanpak waarvan middels 
veldexperimenten is aangetoond dat het een meerwaarde genereert voor de prestatie 
gedurende het leerproces en de retentie van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden. De 
idee is dat critical thinking instructie leidt tot verdieping van de leerstof door middel van 
processen zoals bijvoorbeeld reflectie en het verklaren van de overeenkomsten en 
verschillen tussen taken en taakcontexten, waardoor een meer abstract of algemeen begrip 
van de leertaak bewerkstelligd wordt, wat de retentie en transfer bevordert. De effecten 
van critical thinking instructie zijn echter nooit getoetst in een gecontroleerde experimentele 
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omgeving, en transfer van het geleerde naar andere taken of taakomgevingen werd in de 
eerdere veldstudies niet gemeten.   
De tweede maatregel die tot betere retentie en transfer van complexe 
besluitvormingsvaardigheden zou kunnen leiden is contextuele interferentie. Contextuele 
interferentie verwijst naar interferentie als gevolg van een toevallige opeenvolging van 
leertaken (hoge interferentie; bijv. BAACBC), in tegenstelling tot een geblokte opeenvolging 
van leertaken (lage interferentie; bijv. AA-BB-CC). De effecten van contextuele interferentie 
op prestatie tijdens leren, retentie, near transfer (transfer naar taken die oppervlakkig 
verschillen van de leertaken, maar op structureel niveau gelijk zijn) en far transfer (transfer 
naar taken die oppervlakkig en structureel verschillen van de leertaken) zijn onderzocht 
voor vele verschillende typen taken. Uit deze studies komt naar voren dat hoge contextuele 
interferentie leidt tot betere transfer, met name far transfer, op verschillende complexe 
taken. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van studies naar de effecten van 
contextuele interferentie en worden enkele mechanismen besproken die ten grondslag 
zouden kunnen liggen aan het waargenomen voordeel van een toevalsvolgorde van 
leertaken. Dat zouden bijvoorbeeld processen kunnen zijn, die leiden tot een meer abstract 
en algemeen begrip van de leertaak. Ook zouden leerlingen minder gemotiveerd kunnen zijn 
om zich te verdiepen in de leerstof  als zij werken aan leertaken in een geblokte volgorde. 
Het hoofdstuk besluit met enkele onderzoeksvragen die voortvloeien uit de 
bovengenoemde discussie van relevant onderzoek (a) Wat zijn de effecten van critical 
thinking instructie op transfer van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden? (b) Wat zijn de 
invloeden van contextuele interferentie op leren en transfer van complexe 
besluitvormingsvaardigheden? En (c) wat zijn de gecombineerde effecten van critical thinking 
instructie en contextuele interferentie op het leren, de near transfer en de far transfer van 
complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden? Om deze vragen te beantwoorden zijn in totaal 5 
studies uitgevoerd. Hoofdstuk 3 doet verslag van twee veldstudies naar de effecten van 
critical thinking instructie. Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt twee experimentele 
laboratoriumexperimenten naar de effecten van contextuele interferentie op het leren van 
complexe besluitvorming, en  Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over een experiment naar de 
gecombineerde effecten van critical thinking instructie en contextuele interferentie.  
Hoofdstuk 3 rapporteert twee veldstudies die de effecten van critical thinking instructie op 
complexe beoordeling en besluitvorming onderzoeken. De eerste studie met 
luchtmachtofficieren was gericht op leren en de transfer van command and control van 
grondgebonden luchtverdedigingsoperaties. De tweede studie was gericht op marine-
officieren en onderofficieren die command en control taken van luchtverdedigings- en 
oppervlakte-oorlogsvoeringsoperatie leerden. Deelnemers kregen scenariogebaseerde 
oefeningen in zeer eenvoudige (Studie 1) en dynamische, interactieve (Studie 2) 
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leeromgevingen. In beide studies kreeg de helft van de deelnemers instructie in kritisch 
denken, de andere helft van de deelnemers deed dezelfde oefeningen maar dan zonder 
instructie in kritisch denken. Na de training werd bij beide groepen dezelfde test afgenomen. 
De resultaten onderschrijven de hypothese dat critical thinking instructie een positief effect 
heeft op de transfer van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden, en dat dit effect groter is 
op far transfer dan op near transfer.  
Hoofdstuk 4 presenteert twee laboratoriumexperimenten naar de effecten van de ordening 
van oefenmateriaal op het leren. Een toevallige opeenvolging van leertaken (hoge 
contextuele interferentie) en  een geblokte opeenvolging (lage contextuele interferentie) 
werden met elkaar vergeleken. De deelnemers lazen een beschrijving van een fictieve 
misdaad.  Zij moesten op basis van expliciet gegeven aanwijzingen (‘cues’) in de tekst de 
prioriteit van deze misdaad voor een fictief opsporingsapparaat beoordelen . Uit de 
resultaten van Experiment 1 bleek dat de beoordelingsprestatie op de retentietest hoger 
was na de toevallige volgorde van leertaken dan na een geblokte of operationele volgorde, 
dat wil zeggen, een opeenvolging die is vastgesteld op basis van de frequentie en volgorde 
van taken in de werkelijkheid. Ook Experiment 2 toonde aan dat beoordelingsprestaties op 
een transfertest beter waren na een toevallige volgorde van leertaken dan na een geblokte 
volgorde. Tegen de verwachting in lieten beide experimenten niet zien dat een toevallige 
volgorde van leertaken leidde tot een verminderde prestatie gedurende het leren, zoals dat 
wel vaak werd gevonden in andere studies naar de effecten van contextuele interferentie. 
Tezamen tonen deze resultaten aan dat contextuele interferentie de retentie en transfer van 
complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden bevordert en dat dit bereikt kan worden zonder een 
prestatievermindering gedurende het leren.  
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een studie naar de effecten van critical thinking instructie in 
combinatie met een toevallige of geblokte volgorde van leertaken op het leren en de 
transfer van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden. Evenals in de experimenten beschreven 
in Hoofdstuk 4, lazen deelnemers een beschrijving van een fictieve misdaad en de prioriteit 
van deze misdaad voor een fictief opsporingsapparaat beoordelen op basis van enkele 
aanwijzingen die in elke beschrijving voorkwamen. Echter, anders dan in de experimenten 
van Hoofdstuk 4, werden de aanwijzingen niet expliciet gegeven, maar moesten de 
deelnemers  de aanwijzingen zelf ontdekken in de beschrijving. Het aanbieden van 
verschillende critical thinking prompts (pro-actief, retrospectief, geen) werd gemanipuleerd 
tussen condities: Proactieve prompts werden gegeven voorafgaand aan de taken waarop ze 
betrekking hadden, om zo het kritisch denken vooraf en tijdens de taakuitvoering te 
faciliteren; retrospectieve prompts werden gepresenteerd na de uitvoering van taken 
waarop ze betrekking hadden, om zo de reflectie op deze taken te bevorderen. Daarnaast 
werd, zoals in Hoofdstuk 4, de volgorde van leertaken gemanipuleerd (toevallig, geblokt) om 
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te kunnen bestuderen of de effecten van critical thinking prompts verschilden in beide 
taakvolgorden. De resultaten toonden aan dat –in tegenstelling tot de resultaten bij 
Experiment 4- een geblokte volgorde van leertaken leidde tot een betere prestatie 
gedurende de leerfase. Wellicht kan dit toegeschreven worden aan de complexiteit van de 
taak: De taak was nu complexer dan in de vorige experimenten (Hoofdstuk 4) doordat de 
deelnemers ook de relevante aanwijzingen in de beschrijving moesten identificeren. De 
prestatie op de transfertest liet een duidelijk voordeel zien van een toevallige volgorde van 
leertaken. Zoals voorspeld werd ook een interactie-effect gevonden: In een toevallige 
volgorde van leertaken hadden retrospectieve prompts een meerwaarde op de retentie en 
transfer. In een geblokte volgorde van leertaken kunnen beter proactieve critical thinking 
prompts gegeven worden. 
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert de Algemene Discussie van de bevindingen van de verschillende 
studies en hun implicaties voor theorie en praktijk. Ook worden  de beperkingen van de 
studies besproken en worden suggesties gegeven voor verder onderzoek. Geconcludeerd 
wordt dat critical thinking instructie een significant voordeel oplevert voor het leren van 
complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden. Op basis van de studies in deze dissertatie kan niet 
worden vastgesteld of deze effecten veroorzaakt worden door de instructie als geheel, of 
door specifieke aanwijzingen in de instructie zoals bijvoorbeeld “reflecteer” of “verklaar”.  
Ook de voordelen van contextuele interferentie voor het leren van complexe 
besluitvormingsvaardigheden werden empirisch vastgesteld. Echter, dit voordeel voor 
retentie en transfer van een toevallige volgorde werd in de eerste experimenten gevonden 
zonder een prestatievermindering gedurende het leren ten opzichte van een geblokte 
volgorde, terwijl in een later experiment wel degelijk een prestatievermindering werd 
geconstateerd gedurende het leren als gevolg van een toevallige volgorde van leertaken. Dit 
verschil is lastig te verklaren, maar heeft –zoals eerder genoemd- mogelijk te maken met 
een verschil in taakcomplexiteit tussen de experimenten zoals gerapporteerd in de 
hoofdstukken 4 en 5. Ondanks deze beperkingen wordt geconcludeerd dat de studies 
gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift aantonen dat critical thinking instructie succesvol kan 
worden ingezet voor het leren van complexe besluitvorming. Met een correcte timing van 
critical thinking prompts kan bovendien worden gegarandeerd dat niet enkel een toevallige 
volgorde, maar ook een geblokte volgorde van leertaken leidt tot adequate retentie en 
transfer van complexe besluitvormingsvaardigheden.  
 
